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I. INTRODUCTION
Next to execution, the power to detain individuals is the
most invasive power that the state possesses. A deprivation of
liberty is non-compensable and unjust deprivations shatter our
tenuous sense of autonomy and self-determination. Certain forms
of detention, such as post-conviction imprisonment and pre-
conviction arrest, have gained acceptance and legitimacy. But these
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forms do not exhaust the coercive arsenal of the state. Although
the Canadian state, by design or fortuity, has not been plagued by
institutionalized official abduction and dragnet detention of political
dissidents, the state does possess a mechanism for wide-scale
detention. In the name of law enforcement, we have given officials
wide powers to restrict and suspend the liberty of individuals.
The common law wisdom proclaims that the state is not
permitted to detain individuals against their will save and except for
a proper arrest that is premised upon reasonable and probable
grounds of criminal activity. This wisdom is reflected in, and
strengthened by, the guarantee against arbitrary detention in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 Nonetheless, it is naive
to believe that the state will restrict itself only to such non-invasive
investigative procedures until such time as it acquires the requisite
grounds to effect a proper arrest. Of necessity, the state will
employ liberty-restraining practices of low visibility that manage to
escape public and judicial scrutiny. In particular, the practice of
brief investigative detention is carried out on a daily basis with little
or no accountability. The police power to restrain liberty when the
requisite grounds to effect an arrest are lacking is not a power that
is recognized or accepted in the common law world; however,
investigative detention is part and parcel of the routine activities of
all police forces.
On 1 May 1986, Rene Grafe was stopped by the police while
walking on a street in downtown Kitchener because one officer felt
that there was "something not quite kosher."2  When requested to
provide proper identification, the suspect gave the officers the name
and address of his brother in order to prevent the discovery of the
existence of a warrant that had been issued with respect to an
unpaid fine. Later in the evening, the officers discovered the
misidentification and charged Rene Grafe with fraudulent
personation. In his defence, Grafe invoked the Charter;3 however,
1 Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 R. v. Grafe (1987), 22 O.A.C. 280 at 281 (C.A.) [hereinafter Grafe].
3 In particular, Mr. Grafe claimed that his liberty had been deprived in a manner not
in accord with the principles of fundamental justice, section 7, and that he had been arbitrarily
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the Court of Appeal summarily dismissed this claim because the
interaction with the police did not amount to the type of detention
that triggers the protection of various Charter rights:
The Charter does not seek to insulate all members of society from all contact with
constituted authority, no matter how trivial the contact may be. When one
considers the full range of contacts in modern society between state and citizen that
which took place between the respondent and Constables Kalan and Waite on the
first occasion, cannot be characterized otherwise than as innocuous. Its occurrence
was not an invasion of any of the respondent's Charter rights 4
Although this case may have reached the correct result, one
must recognize that the decision to insulate this police-citizen
interaction from Charter scrutiny masks a number of critical
questions. First, on what basis and for what reasons did the police
decide to intrude? Was Grafe stopped because of his racial
characteristics? Or was he stopped because of his youth or his
perceived membership in a certain socio-economic class? Secondly,
assuming that the stop was undertaken on the basis of neutral
criteria, under what authority were the police acting? Did the
police have the authority to insist that Grafe remain present during
their questioning? Would Grafe have been permitted to refuse
identifying himself without attracting further legal sanction?
A clear and principled basis for the exercise of state
authority must be established in light of the fact that "street
encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in
diversity."-5 If the legislature continues to disregard the questions
that arise out of these encounters, then it is incumbent upon the
courts to structure the citizen-police relationship through its
interpretation of the words "arbitrary detention." At the heart of
the concept of arbitrary detention of any kind is the notion that
state officials should not be able to exercise full unbridled discretion
in their decisions to suspend liberty. Justice La Forest recently had
occasion to comment upon the dangers of low-visibility grants of
discretionary power:
detained, section 9.
4 Supra, note 2 at 286.
5 Teny v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 at 13 (1968) [hereinafter Teny].
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There is another cause for concern in granting such a vague discretion. It is
unlikely to be used as much against the economically favoured or powerful as
against the disadvantaged. As Professor Paul Weiler has stated, "abuses of police
power will rarely affect respectable members of the middle classes," but will instead
"focus upon the poor and on the marginal, minority groups."6
Discretion is the hallmark of individualized justice but it
contains the seeds of an inequity. All too often discretion is
exercised in a manner not consonant with the goals and spirit of
valid legislative objectives. The legitimate goal of protecting
national security became a form of juridical genocide for Japanese-
Canadians during the second world war.7 The legitimate goal of law
enforcement could easily become a form of autocratic harassment of
minority groups. Legal control quickly becomes a more all-
embracing form of social control when official discretion is left
unmonitored. People who are surprised at the increasing racial
tension being exposed in Canadian societys have failed to realize
that "police are formative actors in the determination of national
character."
9
This paper will explore some of the broader questions raised
by investigative detention. To this end we will detail current
approaches to investigative detention, as employed in Canada and
other jurisdictions, with a view to establishing a principled approach
to the right to be free from arbitrary detention. In Part II of the
paper we will explore the Canadian experience with judicial
regulation of police powers of detention. In a nutshell, it is
submitted that the judiciary has been powerlessly ineffective in
providing a principled boundary for the exercise of this power. The
judiciary cannot regulate a power they claim does not exist. In Part
6 R. v. Landry (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 30 (S.C.C.).
7 In 1988, the Government of Canada agreed to award $291 million to Japanese
Canadians wrongfully incarcerated during the war. See W. Walker, "Japanese Canadians Win
Apology to 'Cleanse Past" The Toronto Star (23 September 1988) 1.
8 See R. James & L. Papp, "Passions Flare as Blacks, Police Confront Racism" The
Toronto Star, (15 January 1989) 1; R. James, "Police Tally of 'Crimes by Blacks' Draws Fire"
The Toronto Star (17 February 1989) 1; and A. Story & J. Byer, "Stop Collecting Race
Statistics Police Told" The Toronto Star (18 February 1989) 1.
9 D.H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing A Comparative International Perspective (New
Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1985) at 198.
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III of the paper, the claim will be advanced that investigative
detention is a legitimate police power, and that efforts must be
made to ensure that this power does not blossom into a form of
panoptic surveillance. This can only be achieved if the police are
properly trained and instructed to exercise the power of brief,
investigative detention in response to suspicious indicia of criminal
activity that is not based upon the personal characteristics of the
targeted individual.
Freedom from arbitrary detention should mean more than
protection from official caprice because the notion of capricious
state action is far too underinclusive to capture the real dangers
presented by detention for investigatory purposes. State intrusion in
the name of law enforcement has a tendency to expand into social
control of groups perceived to be deviant or marginalized. It has
been noted that "the history of street powers ... demonstrates that
the traditional practices of law enforcement on the streets have had
very little connection with crime per se and a great deal to do with
social control of the urban populace."1" The freedom from arbitrary
detention in section 9 of the Charter must be construed so as to
account for this potential danger. Without a proper animating
distinction between social control and law enforcement, the right
found in section 9 will only be applied to the most egregious
examples of unjustified intrusion. Meanwhile the daily interactions
between state and citizen will be left to the unmonitored and
unreviewable discretion of law enforcement officials. The history of
policing has revealed a slow and gradual increase in state powers of
intrusion but this increase has not been accompanied by legislative
attempts to regulate these powers.
10 M. Brogden, "Stopping the People - Crime Control Versus Social Control" in J.
Baxter & L Koffman, eds, Police: The Constitution and the Community (Abingdon, England:
Professional Books, 1985) at 106.
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II. POLICE POWERS OF DETENTION IN CANADA
A. The Police Function
The evolution of the police function in society displays a
constant shifting of emphasis amongst various objectives. The police
serve the community through three interrelated objectives: law
enforcement, peace-keeping or order maintenance, and social
services.11 In contemporary times, the law enforcement function of
the police has been the most emphasized, even though it may not
consume most of the police's time.1 2 Attempting to foster an image
of professional specialization, the police have created an image of
the expert crime-fighter, and have downplayed the significant time
and expense invested in their more mundane service functions.
Despite the public's willing acceptance of the image of the police
as skilled investigators armed with a wide array of forensic tests, it
is far more likely that members of the public will interact with the
police when these officials are carrying out their peace-keeping or
service functions.
Virtually all members of the public have had some encounter
with the police in the context of the peace-keeping task of highway
management. While many may feel inconvenienced in being
stopped, most accept this intrusion as part of the scheme of
licensing accompanying the use of automobiles. A more contentious
encounter between police and members of the public is the
questioning of persons on the streets or in their homes. This form
of encounter may be premised upon the police function of law
enforcement or of peace-keeping and, despite an individual's desire
to cooperate with the police, the individual may be disturbed by the
encounter because he or she does not know why the questioning is
taking place.
Historically, the office of constable strongly emphasized a
peace-keeping function and, to that end, public officials were
S. Cohen, "Invasion of Privacy: Police and Electronic Surveillance in Canada" (1982)
27 McGill L.J. 619 at 620-25; also see Bayley, supra, note 9 at 103-59.
12 R. Ericson, Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1982) at 5.
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empowered to stop and question any suspicious person.13
Throughout the history of the common law, statutes had
"empowered the night-watch of each town to detain suspicious night-
walkers until the morning at which time the watchman would either
release the suspect or arrest him if grounds for arrest were
discovered., 14  These peace-keeping powers never generated much
controversy; however, it must be remembered that prior to 1830
policing in England was largely a private or collective function.15
Until the creation of a public police force in England in
1830, the "apparently unshakable British dogma that police spelt
tyranny' 6 was a simple reflection of the fact that the first official
police force created in Europe in the seventeenth century was seen
as a continental spy system. The police in France employed
extensive surveillance as a mechanism for order maintenance and the
common perspective was that "in France the citizen is free to do
what he likes - under police supervision."'17 The advocates of a
public police force in Britain had to reassure their opponents that
the British institution would not be involved in constant surveillance,
infiltration, identity requests, and regulation of all aspects of citizens'
lives.
The pledge to avert tyrannical public policing was to be
secured by the rule of law. Legal control of policing was an
attractive alternative to the highly-centralized and politicized French
police because "Englishmen had long maintained faith in the rule of
13 L. Stern, "Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem" (1967) 58
J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 532; and M. Brogden & A. Brogden, "From Henry III to Liverpool 8:
The Unity of Police Street Powers" (1984) 12 Int. J. Soc. L. 3
14 Stern, ibid. at 532.
15 Police as an institutionalized, state organization did not exist prior to 1830. Initially,
policing was undertaken as a community response and then as a matter of private initiative:
S. Spitzer & A. Scull, "Social Control in Historical Perspective: From Private to Public
Responses to Crime" in D.F. Greenberg, ed., Corrections and Punishment (Beverley Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977). With the creation of a public police force more attention
was drawn to the implications of vesting these state officials with extensive peace-keeping or
order-maintenance powers.
16 W.R. Miller, "Police and the State: A Comparative Perspective" (1986) Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 339 at 343.
17 Ibid. at 341.
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law, and the commissioners made the police into agents of the law,
rather than of the political party in question."' 8  The proper role of
policing centred upon the manners in which the function of law
enforcement could be made too subservient to rule of law concerns.
Forgotten in the debate, as public attention was diverted to the
broader implications of constraining police law enforcement activity,
was the intrusive peacekeeping function that was exercised through
detention and questioning of suspicious persons.
Once the police attained a spectre of professionalism, with
the end of the era of the "keystone cop," attention was once again
drawn to police activities that were not directly concerned with law
enforcement. In light of the ever-increasing crime rate of this
century, theorists of police reform began to turn to the importance
of "aggressive preventive patrol." The dominant theorists in the late
1950s saw great benefits in the ancient constabulary practice of
stopping and questioning suspicious persons.19 O.W. Wilson gave
recognition to the virtues of field interrogation:
The officer lessens opportunity for misconduct by the observation and supervision
of persons and things during his routine movement from one point to another on
his beat, especially when he gives particular attention to areas in which incidents
calling for police service most frequently occur. Street interrogations of persons
whose appearance and actions arouse the suspicion of alert patrolmen are important
tasks in preventive patrol.20
Increased reliance upon aggressive preventive patrol has not
significantly assisted in the stated goal of reducing crime 21 yet it had
a substantial impact upon police-community relations. It has been
noted that "the field interrogation ... probably contributes negatively
to police-public relationships more than any other policing
18 Ibid. at 343.
19 See the discussion in W. Mertons, "The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police
Discretion" (1984) 17 Mich. J.L. Reform 551 at 569-74.
20 O.W. Wilson, Police Administration, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963) at 238.
21 R. Bogomolny, "Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen" (1976) 12 Crim. L.
Bull. 544 at 550-53, 567-74; and Ericson, supra, note 12 at 6. It has been noted that the
empirical evidence concerning the impact of investigatory stops on criminal activity suggests
that only a small percentage of stops - probably less than two percent - results in arrest":
G. Dix, "Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law" (1985) 5 Duke L.J.
849 at 875.
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technique.22 The institutionalization of the ancient constabulary
function of peace-keeping through investigative detention resulted in
the expansion of police powers, the prioritization of discretion, and
a widening sphere of social control. David Bayley has accurately
described the transformation of the modern police officer:
In the nineteenth century prevention was achieved by capturing, punishing, and
warning. With the twentieth century, crime prevention became less passive, not
only a reaction to crimes that had already occurred. Police began to stress solving
problems before crime grew out of them. Special units were developed to work
with potentially wayward persons, such as juveniles, parolees, repeat offenders,
emotionally disturbed, unemployed, minorities, abused children, and violent
families.2 3
This expansion of police presence and power had a
deleterious impact upon community relations primarily because it is
no longer grounded in the peace-keeping and service functions of
the police. James Q. Wilson describes this original service function
by stating that "police officers were originally watchmen whose task
it was to walk their rounds and maintain order in the streets ... [and]
... to maintain order meant everything from removing obstruction on
streets to keeping pigs from running loose, to chasing footpads and
quelling riots."24 This original mandate to maintain the peace has
been modified to account for the increased salience of the police
functions of law-enforcement and crime-prevention. However, the
law had always provided the police with ample power to maintain
peace in the community through their powers to arrest or detain for
breach of peace, or for the offence of causing a disturbance, and it
is therefore likely that the introduction of aggressive patrol practices
has little to do with keeping the peace and is more properly seen as
a generalized form of social control designed to combat the
perceived increase in crime.
22 J. Lohman & G. Misner, Field Sun'eys IV. The Police and the Coimnw1iy
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) at 142.
23 D. Bayley, "Police Function, Structure and Control in Western Europe and North
America: Comparative and Historical Studies" in N. Morris & M. Tonry, eds, Crime and
Justice, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) at 117.
24 J.Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight
Coimnuntides (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) at 31.
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Increasing the presence of the police in the community has
been justified as necessary to curb the burgeoning crime rate.
Politicians and police speak of the ongoing war against crime, and
the resultant fear and insecurity that plagues the public has allowed
the police to firmly entrench their power to intrude. Moreover, by
characterizing police-citizen street encounters as incidences of law-
enforcement, the police are able to legitimate the intrusion by
claiming to be "ministerial agents applying unambiguous, unequivocal
rules to clear-cut cases."25 Nothing could be further from the truth.
These encounters are low-visibility interactions governed by the
discretion of the cop on the beat.
More significantly, the transformation of peace-keeping and
social services encounters into law enforcement transactions
encourages antagonistic and adversarial interactions between police
and citizens. Law enforcement fosters an us-them world view in
which the targets of intrusive action are seen as a "dangerous class"
26
that lives in a relationship of implacable hostility with conventional
citizenry. This assumption of an irreconcilable conflict of interest
between police and members of the public leads to an increased use
of force in the street encounters. Far from being a benign intrusion
to ensure peace on the street, the modern street encounter that is
premised upon law enforcement is primarily an attempt by the police
to assert their authority and maintain order by ensuring compliance
with their command:
To handle his beat and the situations and disputes that develop on it, the patrolman
must assert his authority ... By authority the patrolman means the right to ask
questions, get information, and have his orders obeyed ... The patrolmen observed
for this study almost always acted, and said later they had acted, in such a way as
to show immediately "who was boss."
2 7
The increased coercive presence of the police in the
community might be justifiable if conducted in an even-handed and
25 Ibid. at 67-68.
26 A. Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in
the History of Urban Crime, Police and Riot" in D. Bordua, ed., The Police: Six Sociological
Essays (New York: Wiley, 1967).
2 7 E. Bittner, The Functions of Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors,
Current Practices and Possible Role Models (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlage, Gunn & Hain,
1979) at 32-33.
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non-discriminatory fashion; however, it is now beyond debate that
police discretion is often exercised on a racial and class basis.28 The
police exercise their discretion in a manner that targets those who
appear out of place, and this determination is premised upon race
and socio-economic status. It is said that "officers look for and
employ status cues to determine what action they should take; in
this sense, 'police activity is as much directed to who a person is as
to what he does."29  While the more privileged class in society
generally applauds more aggressive and intrusive law enforcement,
other members of society are constantly exposed to needless state
intrusion:
So long as criminal law enforcement is paramount in the conception of the police
task it will influence everything done. For example, heavy patrol surveillance of
minority neighborhoods and of their inhabitants can be interpreted as pre-emptive
crime prevention, even though it may be perceived as intolerably intrusive,
oppressive, unjust, even racially biased, by the population exposed to it.
30
When the police were more actively engaged in service and peace-
keeping activities their interaction with citizens may have been more
harmonious; however, "removal of these welfare functions caused the
police to focus more on crime control and contacts with the urban
poor became more distant and adversarial than in the past."
31
In the United States, the 1960s spawned a crisis in legitimacy
with respect to the police, and theorists and reformers began to take
a serious look at the dangers of unbridled police discretion and its
As R. Harper noted in 'Has the Replacement of Probable Cause with Reasonable
Suspicion Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds" (1988) 22 Akron L.
Rev. 13 at 38: "Research suggests that while the police do tend to detain and arrest blacks
at a higher rate than they do whites with whom they come in contact, it is probable that race,
in itself, is not the explanatory factor. It is more likely that poverty and low socio-economic
status, with which race tends to be associated, figure importantly into the police detention and
arrest decision. It is thus in poorer neighbourhoods, where the police presence is likely to be
greater, where the citizens' demeanour toward the police may be interpreted as offensive, and
where the people with whom the police interact generally lack resources and other indicia of
social power, that the police are less likely to refrain from stopping citizens for investigation."
See also S. Johnson, "Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect" (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 214.
29 Ericson, supra, note 12 at 17.
30 R. Rumbaut & E. Bittner, "Changing Conception of the Police Role: A Sociological
Review" in Crime and Justice, vol. 1, supra, note 23 at 246.
31 Miller, supra, note 16 at 347.
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impact upon police-community relationships.3 2 The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice33
addressed some of the problems created by aggressive patrol and by
field interrogation. The Commission recommended that state
legislatures and police departments place restrictions and control on
the practice by:
(a) limiting them to circumstances when an officer has reason to believe that a
person is about to commit or has committed a crime;
(b) prohibiting such stops for vagrancy and similar offences;
(c) insisting on an objective basis for the stop, and not on race, youth, or poverty;
(d) imposing temporal limits, allowing only the time necessary to accomplish the
legitimate purposes of the stop;
(e) requiring the police to treat stopped persons civilly;
(f) permitting a search in the course of field interrogation "only if [the officer] has
reason to believe his safety or the safety of others so requires;" and
(g) instituting record 
keeping procedures. 
Many state legislatures have adopted schemes that place
some controls on police field interrogations, and the United States
Supreme Court has had a number of opportunities to address the
constitutional limitations that govern investigative detention.35 In
Canada, the practice of briefly detaining and interrogating suspicious
persons has not been formally recognized as an existing practice.
Report after report on the police and their powers start from the
assumption that the only power that the police have to interfere
with liberty is the power of arrest upon reasonable and probable
grounds. Accordingly, the only issue of contention has been the
officer's use of force to effect an arrest3 6 The Ouimet Report noted
32 Rumbaut & Bittner, supra, note 30 at 241-50.
33 U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task
Force Report: The Police 183-86 (1967) [hereinafter President's Commission].
34 This summary of the recommendations of the President's Commission, ibid, is taken
from Mertons, supra, note 19 at 573-77.
35 See, infra, the accompanying text at notes 136-45.
36 For example, Task Force on Policing in Ontario: Report to the Solicitor-General
(Toronto: Ministry of the Solicitor-General, 1974) at 30; W. Kelly & N. Kelly, Policing in
Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1976) at 133-83; and Report of the Canadian Committee on
Correction: Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 31
March 1969) (Chair. R. Ouimet) at 39-62 [hereinafter Ouimet Report].
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that, though a power of investigative detention upon reasonable
suspicion exists in the United States, such a power need not be
created in Canada due to the adequacy of current arrest powers.
37
It is ironic that the report speaks of no need to authorize and codify
a power of detention short of arrest as this very power is exercised
on a discretionary basis each and every day.
Canadian jurists have not been insensitive to the dangers of
police discretion and they have recognized that "every police force
should adopt a policy of providing control and direction of the use
of discretion and should ensure that it is applied equitably and with
good judgment."38 The problem is that we have yet to recognize
that vast discretionary powers are exercised by the police that do not
ever crystallize into a formal arrest or the laying of a charge. A
study into the adequacy of current police training illustrates that
72.8 per cent of officers perform the task of "check suspicious
persons" at least once a day and that over half of these officers
found their training to be deficient with respect to this activity.
39
Without formal recognition by the legislatures or courts that
detention short of arrest is a mainstay of aggressive patrol practice,
it will be impossible to ever construct a regime of rules and
regulations to protect us from the excesses of poor exercises of
discretion.
B. The Need to Regulate Powers of Detention
When a police officer in his or her service or peace-keeping
function approaches an individual to ask questions, the nature of the
interaction and questioning should not be overly confrontational and
37 Ibid. at 56-57.
38 Kelly, supra, note 36 at 207.
39 C. Shearing & P. Stenning, Police Training in Ontario: An Evaluation of Recruit and
Supervisory Courses (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1980) at 41.
The term "check suspicious person" is the author's. It is unclear what type of intrusion is
contemplated by the term "check"
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intrusive. The inquiry will usually concern questions as to the well-
being of the individual or offers of assistance. Some may be wary
of this paternalistic intrusion, but most people do not perceive an
officer's service and peace-keeping activities as engaging any
constitutional improprieties. On the other hand, when an officer
initiates an encounter for purposes of law enforcement or
prevention, the interaction, by definition, must be more
confrontational. In fact, despite the wide variety of these
encounters, one can be certain that the officer's inquiries will always
revolve around four questions: (1) What are you doing here?; (2)
Where are you going?; (3) Where are you coming from?; and (4)
Would you provide me with some identification?
Questions concerning an individual's comings and goings are
a common aspect of all social interaction, though, admittedly, it
would be surprising for a stranger to ask for this information.
However, a request to provide formal identification beyond one's
name is not an accepted feature of social interaction, and it is
essentially an exercise of authority. Whether it would constitute a
detention, as defined in the next section of the paper, is
problematic,40 and this difficulty in characterization is compounded
by the reluctance of both the judiciary and Parliament to address
the legal significance of a request for identification. There is no
statutory requirement for a citizen to provide proper identification,
except in the context of being stopped while driving a vehicle,
41
and the judiciary has not imposed any obligations upon citizens to
provide identification except in the context of a lawful arrest.42
40 Grafe, supra, note 2; and Re LM.L (1985), 66 A.R. 132 (Alta Prov. Ct).
41 For example, Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, ss 19(1), 30(a) & 189(a).
42 In Moore v. R., [19791 1 S.C.R. 195, the Supreme Court of Canada imposed an
obligation to provide identification when arrested for a minor offence because police officers
must release the name of the individual if, jiter alia, the offender's identity is not an issue.
This intrusion of an individual's right to disregard the inquiries of police officers has been
criticized; however, the obligation to provide identification does not have significant
implications on an individual's liberty and privacy interests because the individual is already
in a situation in which the state can legally effect a deprivation of liberty through arrest. In
fact, the obligation spares the individual a greater loss of liberty.
[VOL. 29 No. 2
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When an officer is not empowered to arrest, yet has
suspicions that require the officer to request identification, the
courts respond by parroting the unrealistic common law wisdom that
it is quite clear that though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social
duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect and indeed the whole
basis of the common law is that right of the individual to refuse to answer questions
put to him by persons in authority.43
This common law right resounds with the symbolism of liberal
political thought; however, in practice, the exercise of the right is
costly. Those who exercise the right are bound to be arrested for
obstruction and are then forced to vindicate their right in the
context of defending themselves against a criminal charge.
In R. v. Guthrie,44 a woman was stopped and a demand was
made that she provide identification. The stop was made close to
the parking lot of the Calgary Police Association, because of earlier
break-ins of police vehicles. The woman refused to identify herself,
and she was then arrested for obstruction. Initially expressing an
interest in seeing the system work, her interest waned as she was
being escorted to the detention centre. She then relented and
provided identification. The Court of Appeal ultimately vindicated
her right to refuse to cooperate, but one must remember that she
paid for this right by being unlawfully detained at the outset by the
police and by having to absorb the time and expense of a trial and
appeal.
Canadian jurists continue to avoid facing the reality of street
encounters by insisting that the police can only invade an individual's
privacy and liberty on a probable cause to arrest or search. This
position reflects the state of the law, yet, it fails to take into account
the fact that despite the absence of authorization, police officers will
make demanding inquiries upon suspicion or intuitive hunches.
Occasionally, the courts will reprimand the police for an
unauthorized intrusion, but this review is limited to the rare cases
in which an individual, like Ms. Guthrie, has the gumption to
challenge police practice. Despite the assertion that detention for
4 3 Pace v. Connolly, [1966] 2 All E.R. 649 at 652 (Q.B.). Tie court quashed a conviction
for obstruction based on an individual's refusal to give his full name and address to the police.
44 (1982), 28 C.R. (3d) 395 (Alta C.A.).
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investigative purposes is unlawful, the practice continues unabated.
In fact, the common law position facilitates investigatory detention
because the ascription of illegality places the practice beyond the
pale of regulation.
The need for regulation of encounters between the police
and the public does not lead ineluctably to the consideration of
identity cards and a requirement of production upon demand. The
use of identity cards as a means of achieving social control is a
controversial political issue that is not easily resolved. During the
revolution, France became the "land of the documented citizen: the
passport and identity card (even the words themselves) originated in
France,"45 and, as discussed earlier, the creation of the first public
police force in England could only attain legitimacy by promising to
avoid the excesses of French policing. It was this documented
citizen that the British sought to avoid when establishing their own
police force. Many people are still of the view that identity cards
are "merely Big Brother's foot in the door,"46 but it must be
recognized that regulation of police-citizen encounters need not
necessitate the introduction of this drastic step.
Regulation does not tilt the scale in favour of facilitation of
policing; it simply subjects a practice of low-visibility to various
constraints. The purpose of regulation is to ensure that the police
do not overstep their authority and convert voluntary cooperation
into coerced assistance and to ensure that the police do not abuse
their liberty to make inquiries by acting indiscriminately or
discriminatorily.
The benefits and shortcomings of regulating street encounters
are well illustrated by the tortuous history of Manuel Gomez's
challenge to police practice in the District of Columbia. Fourteen
years of litigation47 was spawned by Gomez's indignation at being
45 Miller, supra, note 16 at 342.
46 J Angley, Idendto , Cards: The Major Issues, (Barton, A.C.T.: Dept. of the
Parliamentary Library, 1985) the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Legislative
Research Service: Current Issues Brief Number 1, 1985-86 at 15. This report merely outlined
the arguments pro and con of introducing identity cards in Australia without making
recommendations.
47 Gomez v. Layton 394 F.2d 764 (1968) [hereinafter Layton]; Gomez v. Wilson
344 [VOL. 29 No. 2
1991] All Along the Watchtower 345
stopped by police. On two occasions, Manuel Gomez, an hispanic,
was stopped while taking a late-night stroll:
On the first occasion the police filled out a "vagrancy observation" form and warned
appellant that if he was seen in the area again he would be arrested. On the
second occasion, appellant was questioned by five police officers, who demanded to
see his identification, asked whether he was a homosexual and whether he used
marijuana, and had him remove his jacket and roll up his sleeves. Questioning
ceased when appellant said he wished to speak to a lawyer, but the police filled out
another vagrancy form and again warned him that further observations would lead
to an arrest.
4 8
This abusive exercise of authority rarely comes to public attention
because the citizen is usually relieved to emerge from the encounter
without being charged with a criminal offence. Gomez refused to
fade into the background and he sought a declaration that this
police practice was unconstitutional.
The stopping of Gomez in 1968 was authorized by a
vagrancy statute then in force. This statute was ultimately struck
down as being unconstitutional because, as we will discuss later in
the paper, vagrancy statutes are notoriously vague. When the police
lost their major mechanism for intrusion through the vagrancy
statute, they did not make the false claim that they would no longer
be engaged in the practice of investigatory stopping. Instead, the
police created a series of regulations that addressed the issue when
a stop was permissable and how the stop was to be conducted.
In 1973, the police promulgated General Order 304.10 for
the purpose of establishing procedures "governing police-citizen
'contacts', stops, frisks and motor vehicle spot checks."49  The police
430 F.2d 495 (1970); Gomez v. Wilson 477 F.2d 411 (1973); Gomez v. Turner 672 F.2d 134
(1982) [hereinafter Turner]. For a discussion, see M. Murphy, "Encounters of a Brief Kind:
On Arbitrariness and Police Demands for Identification" (1986) 1 Ariz. St. LJ. 207.
48 Layton, ibid. at 765.
49 The terms of the Order are found in Turner, supra, note 47 at 137-38. The General
Order is a directive issued by the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
which sets out policy and procedures. The regulations divided interactions into "contacts" and
"stops" A contact was defined as a "face-to-face communication with an individual under
circumstances in which he is free to leave." The contact could be initiated when an officer
reasonably believed that investigation was justified, and was not limited by a requirement of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. A contact was not justified if an individual was just
"hanging around" or loitering. The regulations directed that officers be as "restrained and
courteous" as possible, and it proscribed the use of force, frisking, or searching. A "stop" was
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undertook to structure and constrain their own exercise of
discretion, and, in order to facilitate meaningful regulation and
supervision, the police were required to fill out a form for every
contact and stop made. The form listed the citizen's identity and
the officer's reasons for initiating the encounter.
This process of compiling a written record permits the public
and the courts to oversee the process to ensure that the police are
not engaged in systemic violations of the Constitution. In the
District of Columbia, the written records revealed that of all persons
approached by the police 80 per cent were non-white, 91 per cent
were male, and 66 per cent were between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-nine °50 In addition, a review of reports indicated that 39.2
per cent of "stops" were unconstitutional because they lacked the
justification of an articulable and objective suspicion.
51
The benefits of regulation are clear. The practice becomes
more predictable and more reviewable. The shortcomings are also
clear. Despite the collection of cogent evidence of indiscriminate
and discriminatory stoppings, there is no evidence to suggest that
these systemic problems are being addressed in any meaningful way.
Regulation has lifted the practices out of the shadows, but public
awareness does not guarantee reform.
Kenneth Davis has contended that the basic means of
controlling discretionary power is to confine, structure, and check
the power.52 Street encounters in Canada are not subject to any of
these forms of regulation, and the police have little or no incentive
to voluntarily undertake a project of self-regulation. What needs to
defined as a "temporary detention of a person for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to arrest that person." A stop could only be initiated upon reasonable
suspicion, and once initiated, the officer was entitled to use force to effect the brief detention.
50 Murphy, supra, note 47 at 236.
51 Ibid. at 237.
52 K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Report (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1969) at 55: "structuring includes plans, policy statements, and rules, as well
as open findings, open rules and open precedents ... Checking includes both administrative
and judicial supervision and review ... By confining is meant the fixing of boundaries, and
keeping discretion within them. The ideal, of course, is to put all necessary discretionary
power within the boundaries, to put all unnecessary power outside the boundaries, and to draw
clean lines. The ideal is seldom realized, and many of the failures are rather miserable ones,
for they frequently result in unavoidable injustice.:
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be explored is whether the judiciary, through their development of
the jurisprudence relating to arbitrary detention, are able to goad
the police toward self-regulation. If the concept of arbitrary
detention is not subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny, then the police
have little incentive to develop policies and procedures relating to
street detention.
It is difficult to gauge the extent of the problems arising
from street detentions that are currently unmonitored by the
judiciary; however, some sense of the magnitude of the problems can
be gained from an examination of the complaints that have been
processed by the Public Complaints Commissioner in Toronto.53 As
indicated in the chart below, it is apparent that police brutality,
although the most notorious, is not the most prevalent complaint.
A majority of complaints arise out of street encounters conducted
without restraint and civility.
Table 1
Public Complaints
TYPE OF COMPLAINT 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Of great significance is the fact that
complaints do not give rise to further criminal
the vast majority of
proceedings. This is
precisely why street encounters are a practice of low-visibility. If the
53 Annual Report of ie Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner and the Police
Complaints Board (Toronto: The Office, 1982-86).
Incident occurring 51.6% 52.4% 51.9% 48.3% 50.9%
on the street
Incident involving incivility, 78% 76.3% 69.9% 62.1% 56.6%
harassment, verbal abuse, or threat
Incident during criminal 26.1% 34.3% 29.2% 30.2% 25.2%
investigation
Incident during an interrogation or 6.4% 4.4% 2.3% 0.8% 1.6%
during a request for identification
Incident where complainant 66.2% 69.2% 70.3% 66.2% 64.9%
was not charged
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judiciary is committed to the supervision and control of intrusive
police practice, then it must realize that this objective can only be
accomplished by dealing with cases that manage to rise to the
surface in a manner that will have an impact upon all the other
cases that remain in the shadows. The Court must probe beyond
the narrow interests of the litigants and construct rules and
principles to provide guidance. If the rules and principles are short-
sighted or impractical, then the shortcoming of judicial lawmaking
may finally goad the legislature into action. If nothing is done by
the judiciary, whether positive or negative, then it is likely that
nothing will also be done by the political institutions that are best-
suited for reform of police practice. To date, the judicial response
to issues relating to detention has been restrained.
C. Detention in Canadian Law
The right not to be arbitrarily detained is semantically clear,
but conceptually problematic. Powers of detention have been
legislatively created in a number of contexts that are unrelated to
the criminal process, including quarantine and involuntary
commitment,54 but within the criminal process, with the exception
of the procedures relating to breathalyser testing, we find that
virtually all deprivations of liberty are premised upon a power to
arrest for past, present, and future commission of offences.
With respect to police powers the conventional wisdom has
always been that, unless the police are "armed with express authority
to justify their actions,"'55 police intrusion upon rights is deemed to
be illegal. The requisite express authority can be found either in
statute or at common law. In recent years this conventional wisdom
has undergone some modification with the introduction of an
''ancillary powers" doctrine - a device relied upon by the judiciary to
create new powers based upon the inference that the power is
For a catalogue of esting powers outside the criminal process, see Canada, Arrest
(Working Paper 41) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985) at 16-26, 137-43.
55 R. v. Coldt (1981), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 105 at 111 (S.C.C.).
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reasonably necessary to effect a duty.5 6 However, the historical
legitimacy of the position that state power must be expressly
authorized still continues to influence decision-making.
In the context of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada
has constitutionalized the requirement of an express grant of power
with respect to the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. The Court has stated that "a search will be reasonable if it
is authorized by law";57 thus legality becomes a prerequisite for
constitutional compliance. A similar model of constitutionality has
not been invoked with respect to arbitrary detention; the courts do
not require proof that the detention be authorized by law. This
lowered threshold of constitutionality cannot flow from an argument
that arbitrary exercises of power are interpreted more liberally than
unreasonable exercises of power. Rather, the omission of a
requirement of legality from the concept of arbitrary detention is
simply a practical reflection of the fact that lawmakers have refused
to address the issue of authority to detain, as they have done with
respect to powers of arrest and search. 58
Notwithstanding the absence of express authority, police
powers of detention for investigative purposes have been
retroactively legitimated by the judiciary except when the Court
concludes that the detention has been arbitrarily exercised.
However, even this judicial disapproval of arbitrary police powers to
detain for investigative purposes only pertains to intrusive actions
that meet the Court's definition of detention. As in Grafe, some
intrusions are considered unworthy of constitutional protection.
Without a legislative foundation as a starting point for analysis, the
56 For example, R. v. Dedman (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). A useful analysis
of the shift in judicial attitude towards the creation of police powers can be found in R. Ways,
"Mhe Law of Police Authority: The McDonald Commission and the McLeod Report" (1985)
9 Dalhousie L.R. 683.
57 R. v. Collins (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
58 In fact, the original wording of section 9 of the Charter reflected a concern for legality
and authorized power. In the proposed resolution of October, 1980, The Canadian
Constitution 1980: Proposed Resohtion Respecting the Constittion of Canada (Ottawa:
Publications Canada, 1980) at 15, section 9 read: "Everyone has the right not to be detained
or imprisoned except on grounds, and in accordance with procedures, established by law."
This wording was rejected, probably based on fears that present powers of police detention
would not meet its test.
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courts have undertaken to construct a typology of state intrusions
characterized as detention.
Much of the caselaw that has struggled with defining the
level of intrusion necessary to constitute detention involve motor
vehicle stops. Despite the obvious problems of commensurability,
the courts have not distinguished between the legal status of a driver
and the legal status of an individual walking on the street. The
Supreme Court of Canada rejected the pre-Charter jurisprudence
that defined detention as requiring "some form of compulsory
restraint,"' 9 and replaced it with a functional test more in tune with
the reality of police-citizen interactions. In R. v. Therens,60 the
Supreme Court of Canada had to resolve whether a motorist who
has been given a breathalyser demand is detained notwithstanding
the absence of compulsory or physical restraint. In an insightful
comment that set the tone for developing the new test of detention,
Justice Le Dain remarked:
In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance with a
demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the sense that the
citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not, even when there is in fact
a lack of statutory or common law authority for the demand or direction and
therefore an absence of criminal liability for failure to comply with it. Most citizens
are not aware of the precise limits of police authority.
6 1
Accordingly, the Court developed a threefold test for
determining when a police-citizen encounter constitutes detention.
Detention occurs when there is (1) "a deprivation of liberty by
physical constraint,"62 (2) "criminal liability for failure to comply with
a demand or direction of a police officer,"63 or (3) "psychological
compulsion in the form of a reasonable perception of suspension of
freedom of choice."64 The first scenario is a reaffirmation of the
pre-Charter test and it applies to the obvious instances of detention
59 This earlier test is taken from R. v. Chroiiak, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 at 478-79.
60 (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
61 Ibid. at 125.
62 Ibid. at 124.
63 Ibid. at 125.
6 4 Ibid. at 125-26.
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that are tantamount to being taken into custody. The second
scenario is currently limited to breathalyser procedures in which the
police are statutorily empowered to demand breath or blood
samples. The third scenario of psychological compulsion is the one
that will apply to police-citizen interactions that are ambiguous due
to the absence of legislative authority for the intrusion.
The moment at which an interaction is converted into a
detention is critical. Then the citizen can invoke Charter protection
against arbitrary detention as well as the Charter requirement of
being informed of one's right to consult counsel. When a state
official is carrying out investigatory procedures that are authorized
by legislation, when detention occurred will most likely be
determined by an assessment of the severity of the state intrusion.
65
Tying the concept of detention into the level of intrusiveness
is a simple exercise that usually produces determinate and
predictable results. However, the type of interactions that occur
between citizens on the street and police officers carrying out
investigative tasks do not present distinct levels of intrusiveness.
The line dividing constitutionally-protected interactions and those
deemed inconsequential by the courts is not clear-cut and it turns
upon a weighing of numerous factors in an attempt to determine if
the individual has a reasonable perception that his or her liberty is
being suspended. The Ontario Court of Appeal has provided a
catalogue of relevant factors that may assist a court in determining
if detention exists and this wide-ranging inquiry underscores the
indeterminacy of the assessment:
(1) the precise language used by the police and whether the accused was given a
choice;
65 For example, Customs and Immigration officials are empowered to question all
individuals arriving in Canada. Chief Justice Dickson assessed the legal relationship between
the individual arriving in Canada and the state official in R. v. Simmons (1988), 66 C.R. (3d)
297 at 313 (S.C.C.). He asserted that there are three distinct types of interactions that range:
(1) from routine questioning which every traveller undergoes at a port of entry, accompanied
in some cases by a search of baggage and perhaps a pat or frisk of outer clothing, (2) from
the strip or skin search conducted in a private room, after a secondary examination and with
the permission of a customs officer in authority, and (3) from body cavity search with the
aid of medical doctors, to x-rays, to emetics, and to other highly intrusive means. The
"routine questioning" scenario does not amount to detention, but the other, more intrusive
interactions cross the threshold.
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(2) whether the accused came to the station unescorted by the police;
(3) whether the accused was free to leave at the completion of the interaction; and
(4) the stage of the investigation; such as did the police already suspect that the
accused was the perpetrator or were they still at the stage of a generalized
investigation.
(5) the nature of the questioning; was it confrontational or of a general nature;
(6) the subjective belief of the accused, including consideration of the intellectual
and emotional level of the individual, as to his or her freedom to leave;
6 6
The balancing of these various factors have led courts to
conclude that no detention exists when the police request
attendance at the station,67 when the police question an individual
at his or her home,68 or when the individual attends at the police
station accompanied by a lawyer, friend, or family.69 Even though
these examples are instances of less intrusive police activity, the
question remains open to question if the "balancing of factors"
approach adequately measures reasonable perception of suspension
of freedom of choice. Justice Le Dain's premise that it is unrealistic
to regard compliance with the police as "truly voluntary" must not be
forgotten. Any interaction between police and citizen is an exercise
of state authority and most citizens, not being aware of their rights,
will assume they must remain in the custody of the police until they
are told to leave.
70
If most citizens feel compelled to cooperate with the police71
by remaining in police custody until dismissed, then virtually every
66 R. v. Moran (1987), 36 C.C.C (3d) 225 at 258-59 (Ont. C.A.).
67 R. v. Bazinet (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 273 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Bazinet].
68 R. v. Esposito (1985), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88 (Ont. C.A.).
69 R. v. Smith (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 361 (Man. C.A) [hereinafter Smith]; and R. v.
Hicks (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394 (Ont. C.A.).
70 For a discussion of the nature of police-citizen interactions and of the fact that citizens
rarely exercise their right to disregard the police, see C. Reich, "Police Questioning of Law
Abiding Citizens" (1965-66) 75 Yale LJ. 1161, and R. Ayers & J. Griffiths, "A Postscript to
the Miranda Project" (1967) 77 Yale LJ. 300.
71 As one commentator said: "[I]t is not meaningful in practice to attempt to distinguish
between field interrogation with consent and that which takes place without consent. In high
crime-areas, particularly, persons who stop and answer police questions do so for a variety of
reasons, including a willingness to cooperate with police, a fear of police, a belief that a
refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a combination of all three": L. Tiffany, D.
McIntyre & D. Rotenberg, Detection of Crime: Stopping and Questioning Search and Seizure,
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encounter, whether innocuous or overbearing, would trigger a
reasonable perception of being detained. It appears that the courts
do not employ a reasonable person test that is empirically-based,
but rather they employ a normative concept of reasonableness based
on an assessment of when an individual should believe that he or
she is being detained.
The American treatment of this issue reveals a similar
normative approach.7 2 Three categories of police-citizen encounters
are recognized in American law: "communications between police
and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore
without the compass of the fourth amendment, brief 'seizures' that
must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and full-scale arrests that
must be supported by probable cause."73  In order to trigger
constitutional safeguards there must be a seizure of the person and
in 1980 the u.s. Supreme Court clarified the standard by
distinguishing between the seizure and no-seizure categories.
Sylvia Mendenhall was stopped at the Detroit airport by two
Drug Enforcement agents because her conduct was characteristic of
drug couriers.74 The agents asked her to produce identification and
an airline ticket, and as a result of a discrepancy between the names
listed on her driver's licence and on the airline ticket, the agents
further investigated until a search revealed that she was in
possession of heroin. The u.s. Supreme Court needed to decide if
the initial stopping and questioning amounted to a seizure that
required an objective justification. In deciding that this encounter
fell into the no-seizure category, it was stated:
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
Encourage and Entrapment (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) at 1Z
72 The American Constitution does not contain a provision securing a right against
arbitrary detention; therefore, the courts deal with police-citizen encounters in the context of
the Fourth Amendment: U.S. Const. Amend. IV [hereinafter Fourth Amendment]. In
Canada, the courts determine whether the individual was arbitrarily detained; the American
courts determine whether there was an "unreasonable seizure'
73 U.S. v. Beny, 670 F.2d 583 at 591 (1982).
74 U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 at 547 (1980). The officers testified that the
accused's behavior fit the drug courier profile.
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reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt
to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled ... In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise
inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a
matter of law, amount to a seizure of the person.
75
In essence, the concept of restricting detention or seizure is
an attempt to capture state activity that the Court believes
sufficiently intrusive to require judicial scrutiny. Reasonable
individuals may feel compelled to cooperate with the requests or
demands of police officers, however, the mere fact that officers are
able to induce compliance by virtue of their perceived authority is
not sufficient to command judicial review. The Court will only
intervene "if the officer adds to those inherent pressures by engaging
in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social intercourse,"
and it will not intervene if "the policeman, even in making inquiries
a private citizen would not, has otherwise conducted himself in a
manner which would be perceived as a non-offensive contact if it
occurred between two ordinary citizens."
76
By ignoring the inherent pressures that an officer can bring
to bear simply by virtue of his or her position, the threshold
determination of whether or not a detention or seizure has occurred
becomes an abstraction. This abstraction fails to reflect the reality
of power. While the courts debate whether the police officer was
too overbearing, or the citizen was too easily intimidated, the reality
is that the police will exercise whatever power is necessary to effect
75 Ibid. at 554-55. As in Canada, the American conception of the reasonable person
is not empirically-based. This is clearly indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court in their
application of the Mendenhall test in a subsequent case that challenged the practice of
immigration officers in conducting "surveys" of factories in search of illegal aliens: LN.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). The factory survey consisted of armed officers being positioned
near the exits to question employees. The court held that the stationing of officers at exits
did not lead individuals to believe that they would be detained although those who tried to
flee or evade questioning were ultimately detained.
76 W. Lafave, "'Seizures' 1ypology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve
Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues" (1984) 17 Mich. J.L. Reform 417. For further
discussion of this article and the no-seizure rule, see E. Butterfoss, "Bright Line Seizures:
The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins" (1988) 79
3. Crim. L. & Criminology 437.
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their objective. If the police have reason to believe, whether
justified or not, that an individual can assist in an investigation, they
will request or demand that the individual speak with them.
Whether or not the questioning takes place at the individual's home,
in the officer's patrol car, or at the station, the police will not allow
the individual to leave until they are satisfied that they will not be
able to obtain valuable information. This is clearly borne out by
cases in which the courts have considered the admissibility of
incriminating statements made during an encounter that the Court
characterized as a detention. In these cases, the police held
individuals in detention for anywhere between two hours and a full
day77 - the individual being detained as long as required in order
to secure a confession or until it appears that a confession is
unlikely to materialize.
These cases are only the tip of the iceberg. The fact that
the police will suspend the liberty of individuals for lengthy periods
of time only comes to light in cases in which the individual
ultimately confesses and a prosecution is then initiated. In these
cases the individual may be entitled to a remedy of exclusion of
evidence; however, if the individual does not confess and a trial is
therefore not commenced, the lengthy detention will never be the
subject of judicial review for arbitrary detention. Unless the
individual complains, which is unlikely, there will be no remedy for
the constitutional violation.
D. Arbitrary Detention
Once an encounter between police and citizen crosses the
threshold that distinguishes innocuous contact from detention, the
right not to be arbitrarily detained is triggered. This right has a
dual purpose in that it serves to protect against deprivations of
liberty (detention) and impairment of an individual's security interest
(arbitrary). The threshold determination that an encounter
constitutes a detention ensures that the protections of the Charter
77
R. v. Nugent (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (N.S.C.A.) (all day detention); R. v. Soares
(1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 403 (Ont. C.A.) (three hour detention); Bazinet, supra, note 67 (two
hour detention); and R. v. Smith, supra, note 69 (three hour detention).
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are not trivialized by being applied to state conduct that is of
minimal intrusiveness; however, once the deprivation of liberty is
significant enough to warrant review, the Court is then required to
assess whether the individual's security interest was impaired
arbitrarily. Arbitrary state action produces a subjective, intrusive
effect.78 It creates an atmosphere of vulnerability and powerless-
ness, as the individual is left guessing as to why he or she has been
intruded upon. Arbitrary intervention by the state induces a state
of insecurity as the right to be left alone becomes precariously
grounded upon unpredictable state action.
To date, there have been noticeably few cases that discuss
the meaning of arbitrary detention and the courts have displayed a
marked reluctance to provide a definitive approach to the concept
of arbitrariness. In fact, whenever possible, the courts avoid
deciding the issue of whether an arbitrary detention is present,
preferring to dispose of any constitutional issues by reference to
other provisions of the Charter. In 1987, the Supreme Court of
Canada had the opportunity of deciding whether the seven year
minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of importation of
narcotics constituted arbitrary detention; however, the Court refused
to deal with this issue preferring to dispose of the case on the basis
of section 12 of the Charter, cruel and unusual punishment.79
A few months later, the Court had another opportunity. It
was argued that the provisions of the Ciminal Code of Canada
80
dealing with dangerous offenders constituted arbitrary detention and
therefore were unconstitutional!' The process of designating an
offender as dangerous was based upon inherently unreliable
psychiatric evidence. There were also no guidelines to structure a
prosecutor's unfettered discretion as to when to make a dangerous
offender application. The Court was reluctant to establish the
parameters of the right stating that "this Court has not yet
78 Murphy, supra, note 47 at 211.
79 R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
8 0 Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss 752-762 [hereinafter Criminal Code].
81 R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 [hereinafter Lyons]. These provisions allow for an
indeterminate sentence on an accused previously convicted of a crime of "serious personal
injury' who poses a threat of future violence.
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pronounced on the scope and meaning of the words 'arbitrarily
detained and imprisoned' and I do not think this would be an
appropriate case to do so."82 Without much discussion the Court
ultimately held that the provisions do not violate the right to be free
from arbitrary detention on the basis that
even giving the word "arbitrary" its broadest signification, it is readily apparent that
not only is the incarceration statutorily authorized, but that the legislation narrowly
defines a class of offenders with respect to whom it may properly be invoked, and
prescribes quite specifically the conditions under which an offender may be classed
as dangerous. If these criteria are themselves unconstitutional, it is because they
otherwise fail adequately to safeguard the liberty of the individual, not because they
are arbitrary
8 3
This holding suggests that, regardless of the substantive
content of the right, the Charter will not be violated if the detention
is prescribed or authorized by law. This is a misleading impression
because the only aspect of arbitrary detention that has, to date,
achieved a judicial consensus is that a detention that is authorized
may still be arbitrary, depending upon the criteria contained in the
legislation.8 4 Legislatively-prescribed detention does not insulate the
conduct from a challenge of arbitrariness. It is also clear that
legislative authorization is not a constitutional prerequisite for a
detention to survive challenge upon the basis of arbitrariness.
Most of the cases which have struggled with defining the
parameters of arbitrary detention have taken place in the context of
motor vehicle stops which meet the judicial definition of a detention.
In most provinces the police are empowered by statute to stop
vehicles and request the ownership and insurance documents from
the driver.85 The stopping of vehicles may be authorized for
82 Aid. at 346.
83 ibid. at 347.
84 R. v. Konechny (1983), 10 C.C.C. (3d) 233 at 242 (B.C.C.A.); Lyons, supra, note 81
at 347; Tiwaites v. Health Sciences Centre (1988), 51 Man. R. (2d) 196 at 202 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Thwaites]; and R. v. Cayer (1988), 66 C.R. (3d) 30 at 43 (Ont. C.A.).
85 For example, the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 189a(1), provides: "A
police officer, in the lawful execution of his duties and responsibilities, may require the driver
of a motor vehicle to stop and the driver of a motor vehicle, when signalled or requested to
stop by a police officer who is readily identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a safe
stop"
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regulatory purposes, yet its significance transcends this limited
purpose because:
Mhe police claim that their powers to direct and stop traffic, to check on licences
and insurance, are essential if they are to catch the motorized criminal and most
criminals nowadays, like most other people, travel by car. Organized crime in
particular depends heavily upon the succession of stolen vehicles.06
In recent years, the police have found that random stops and
spot-check stops of vehicles are particularly useful for the detection
of impaired driving. In 1985, The Supreme Court of Canada
decided that spotchecks pursuant to the R.I.D.E. program8 7 were a
justified exercise of police powers, notwithstanding the fact that the
program had not been authorized by legislation 8 The Court
employed the "ancillary powers" doctrine to uphold the program of
random stops at a spot-check on the basis that the power was a
reasonable and necessary adjunct to the duty imposed upon the
police to ensure safety upon the roads. In addition, the Court
believed that the intrusion occasioned by the exercise of power was
limited and that the well advertised nature of the program reduced
any anxiety or insecurity experienced by drivers who had been
stopped.
This case only decided that random vehicle stops by the
police were authorized at common law by the ancillary powers
doctrine. The Court did not decide whether the random nature of
the detention violated the Charter. This latter issue spawned
numerous inconsistent appellate decisions that eventually crystallized
into a relatively clear exposition of the nature of arbitrary
detention.8 9 One Court noted that "the essence of arbitrariness is
capriciousness in, and the lack of a reasoned foundation for, the
interference with the right that is at the centre of both section 8
86 L. Radzinowicz & J. King, The Growth of Crime: The International Experience (New
York: Basic Books, 1977) at 166.
87 R.I.D.E. (reduce impaired driving everywhere) is a program of organized roadblocks
where the police randomly stop vehicles for the detection of impaired drivers.
8 8 R. v. Dednan, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2.
8 9 R. v. Neufeld (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Rackow (1986), 30 C.C.C.
(3d) 250 (Alta C.A.); R. v. Doucettc (1986), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 547 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Iron (1987),
55 C.R. (3d) 289 (Sask. C.A.); and R. v. Ladouceur (1987), 57 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.).
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and section 9: the right to be left alone."90  Another court
described arbitrariness as a spectrum of attitude ranging from
whimsical to despotic:
Thus, on the one hand, the term arbitrary has the connotation merely of being
"dependent upon the will or pleasure," or being "left to one's judgment or choice"
or being "at the discretion or option of anyone," while, on the other hand it has
also has a more odious meaning of "capriciousness," of being "based on a notion
or whim," of being "despotic.' 1
In order to bring the provision in Ontario that allows for
stopping of vehicles up to constitutional muster, the Court of
Appeal read down the provision so that it could only apply if the
police are conducting an organized roadblock in which all cars are
stopped or when the police stop an individual driver for some
"articulable cause." However, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed
the provision to stand and thus legitimated the stopping of vehicles
without cause, whether by organized spotchecks92 or by roving and
random stops.
93
The Supreme Court held that the provision permitted and
authorized arbitrary detention because "there were no criteria for
the selection of the drivers to be stopped and subjected to the spot
check procedure."94  The absence of any guiding criteria was
objectionable because it left the selection of drivers "in the absolute
discretion of the police officer."95 Notwithstanding the finding of
arbitrariness, the Court went on to uphold the provision as a
reasonable limitation of the right pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter96  Voluminous statistical data was presented to show that
random vehicle stops were an effective and needed law enforcement
90 Iron, ibid. at 311.
91 R v. Ladouceur, supra, note 89 at 64.
92 R v. Hufsky (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Hufsk3'].
93 R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 [hereinafter Ladouceur].
94 Ibid. at 18.
95 Ibid. at 23.
96 Section 1 reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
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mechanism to curb the increasing traffic fatalities produced by
impaired drivers and unlicensed drivers.
A similar approach to arbitrariness is found in the decision
of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in which the Court struck down
provisions in the Mental Health Act9 7 allowing for involuntary
commitment. 98 The Act provided that a magistrate could compel an
individual to submit to medical examination "where any person ... is
suspected or believed to be in need of examination and treatment
in a psychiatric facility." Similarly, an order requiring involuntary
commitment could be issued upon a showing that "a person should
be confined as a patient at a psychiatric facility." The Court
contended that the relevant question was whether "the legislation
that authorizes detention sufficiently defines the persons who may
be subject to the legislation, and the circumstances under which they
may be compulsorily detained."99  The Court found that the
legislation failed to adequately specify the relevant guiding criteria
needed to rescue the provisions from a finding of arbitrariness but
unlike the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada with respect
to random vehicle stops, the Court would not uphold the legislation
as a reasonable limit under section 1 because the "impugned
provisions lacked objective criteria.
'100
The upshot of these cases is that arbitrariness is found in
state action that is capricious, despotic, or simply ungoverned by
principled criteria. This approach to defining arbitrariness is thus
ineffective because it replaces the term arbitrary with other
synonyms without instantiating the concept. The essence of
arbitrariness may be the absence of guiding criteria, yet the Court is
reluctant to suggest what form of guidance should be offered to the
police. One may contend that the necessary criteria can only be
provided by the legislature, and in terms of considerations of
institutional competence, this contention has much force. However,
97 R.S.M. 1970, c. M-110.
98 Thwaites, supra, note 84.
99 Ibid. at 201.
100 Ibid. at 205.
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while we wait for legislators to overcome their legislative inertia,101
the court should fill the void by issuing tentative guidelines.
The failure to develop the concept of arbitrariness beyond
mere rhetorical pronouncements does little to guard against arbitrary
conduct in the future.10 2 Arbitrariness is the absence of reasoned
decision-making. The right to be free from arbitrary detention is a
command to the police to apply their experience, expertise, and
reasoning to ensure that deprivations of liberty are not based upon
whims and prejudices. For example, the B.C. County Court stayed
a prosecution for the offence of soliciting because the police
detained the accused overnight based only on a departmental policy
and not upon any consideration of whether the detention was
required in accordance with section 452 of the Criminal Code. 03
The judge contended that an arrest or detention "should be based
on reasons relating specifically to that individual,"1 4 and that the
fettering of discretion by reliance upon departmental policy
constituted arbitrary detention.
One might accordingly conclude that individualized decision-
making is a prerequisite for non-arbitrary detention; however, the
decision of the B.C. County Court is the exception. Numerous courts
have held that overnight detention based on departmental policy
does not violate the Charter.105 To understand why some courts do
101 For a discussion of the concept of legislative inertia and its impact on the judicial
function, see G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1982); H. Friendly, 'The Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Who Can't
and Legislators Who Won't" (1963) 63 Colum. L. Rev. 787; and G. Gilmore, "On Statutory
Obsolescence" (1967), 39 Colo. L Rev. 411.
102 For example, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that random vehicle stops
are arbitrary, but none the less constitute a reasonable limit, is a decision oblivious to the
broader implication of the ruling. The stops were a reasonable limit because of the
importance of curbing impaired driving. Presumably, a random stop is only justified if the
police stop a vehicle to check the driver's sobriety. Without showing articulable reasons the
police can randomly stop a vehicle for any reason and then assert that the stop was to check
sobriety.
1 03 R. v. Pithart (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (B.C. Co. Ct) [hereinafter Pithart].
104 Ibid. at 160.
105 R. v. Cayer (1988), 66 C.R. (3d) 30 (Ont. CA.); R v. Macintosh (1984), 29 M.V.R.
50 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Pahovitz (1987), 59 C.R. (3d) 396 (Sask. CA); and R. v. Kassam (18
February 1987), (B.C. Prov. Ct) [unreported]. The latter is cited in Pithart, supra, note 103
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not require the police to individualize their decisions, the broader
considerations animating the concept of arbitrary detention must be
explored.
The cases dealing with random vehicle stops expose the
danger sought to be controlled through section 9 of the Charter. In
their disapproval of random vehicle stops, the Ontario Court of
Appeal wisely points out that an intrusion that is not based upon
some articulable cause
gives a discretion so wide that police officers can use it to choose the younger
driver over the older, the less sartorially acceptable over the more sartorially
respectable, the owner of an older or cheaper car over the one who drives a more
expensive or a more commonly-driven car, even a person obviously visible as being
.. 106a minority group over one who is clearly of the majority.
The problem with police activity that is not a product of deliberation
and principled reasoning is that the police may exercise their
discretion in a discriminatory fashion.
This fear of discrimination posing as discretion lies at the
heart of the u.s. Supreme Court's decision to strike down random
vehicle stops.1°7 The Court would not permit random stops, but
suggested that "questioning of all oncoming traffic at a road-block
type stop"108 may be a constitutionally permissible alternative/°9 In
at 159 and in R. v. Sieben (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (Alta C.A.).
106 R. v. Ladouceur, supra, note 89 at 71. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Ladouceur, supra, note 93 at 25, failed to recognize the dangers of discriminatory law
enforcement arising from police activity ungoverned by criteria. Upholding the roving and
random vehicle stop as a reasonable limitation under section 1 the Court noted: "Finally, it
must be shown that the routine check does not so severely trench upon the s. 9 right so as
to outweigh the legislative objective. The concern at this stage is the perceived potential for
abuse of this power by law enforcement officials. In my opinion, these fears are unfounded.
There are mechanisms already in place which prevent abuse. Officers can stop persons only
for legal reasons, in this case reasons related to driving a car such as checking the driver's
licence and insurance, the sobriety of the driver and the mechanical fitness of the vehicle.
Once stopped the only questions that may justifiably be asked are those related to driving
offences." Though the Court correctly noted that the police may only stop for a limited
objective, nothing prevents the police stopping drivers in a discriminatory or offensive manner.
107 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct 1391 (1979).
108 Ibid. at 1401. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld a roadblock scheme
which stopped all drivers in the absence of any articulable suspicion: Michigan Department
of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct 2481 (1990) [hereinafter Michigan Department].
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dissent, Justice Rehnquist was puzzled by the Court's disapproval of
the marginally intrusive stop and its approval of the more intrusive
roadblock and he quipped that the Court has elevated the old adage
that "misery loves company" to constitutional proportions. What is
absent in this sarcastic rejoinder is the realization that, although a
roadblock may cause greater inconvenience and it may impact upon
more innocent drivers, it reduces the possibility of discrimination to
a bare minimum. Similarly, overnight detention at the police station
in accordance with a blanket policy may result in the unjustifiable
detentions of some, but the policy ensures that the decision to
detain cannot be premised upon the individual's racial, socio-
economic, or ethnic characteristics. Thus, arbitrary detention relates
not only to indiscriminate state intrusion, but also to discriminatory
intrusion.
Turning from vehicle stops to street encounters, we find an
astonishing paucity of reported case law. In the three leading cases
to date,110 the courts have struggled with the problem of the proper
police response where there is a suspicion of criminality but no
reasonable and probable grounds. The Duguay case illustrates the
dilemma. In that case, the police were investigating a break and
enter and it came to their attention that a number of youths were
in an adjacent backyard at the time of the burglary, and, prior to
the break and enter, they had asked the homeowner-victim where he
kept his dog during his absence from the house. These facts casted
a suspicion upon the youths, and the officer would have been remiss
109 Whether roadblocks are unconstitutional has generated a great deal of controversy
in the United States. To decrease the discretion exercised by police, the legislatures must
construct criteria that account for "(1) the availability of less intrusive means for combating
the problem; (2) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; (3) the degree of discretion left
to the officer in the field; (4) the standards set by superior officers; (5) the degree of fear or
anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (6) the average length of time each motorist is
detained; (7) the maintenance of safety conditions; (8) the advance warning to the public; (9)
the physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (10) the advance
warning to the individual approaching motorist; (11) the location designated for the roadblock;
and (12) the time and duration of the roadblock": L Giaquinto, 'Designing Constitutional
Sobriety Roadblocks: A Comparative Study using the Model in Fury v. City of Seattle and
State v. Deskins" (1988) 24 Willamette L Rev. 129 at 149.
110 R. v. Duguay (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. CA.), aff'd 1 S.C.R. 93 [hereinafter
Duguay]; R. v. Brown (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54 (N.S.S.C.); R. v. Spence (1988), 51 Man. R.
(2d) 142 (Man. CA).
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in failing to follow up this slim lead. Unfortunately, the officer went
to the extreme of taking the youths into custody claiming that the
youths were arrested "to determine whether they actually did it or
not."
I1
The Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the youths'
confessions because the police had acted arbitrarily in taking the
youths into custody. The Court reasoned that an arrest must be
based upon reasonable and probable grounds, and that the arrest
was unauthorized because the officers lacked this requisite degree of
suspicion of guilt. However, the Court continued by asserting that
arbitrariness is not to be equated with lack of authority and that an
arbitrary or capricious detention will only be found upon an entire
absence of reasonable grounds. The Court did not stipulate what
lesser standard of suspicion would suffice to allow the police to
detain an individual. They simply concluded that the police "had
neither grounds nor an honest belief that they had the necessary
grounds.
112
The dissent both in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme
Court of Canada focused upon the suspicions that motivated the
police. This suspicion surely did not justify the exercise of a power
of arrest, but it -may justify some lesser investigatory intrusion.
Unfortunately, the decision of the majority contains a contradictory
direction for the police that casts doubt upon the propriety of brief
investigatory detention. Even though the Court held that reasonable
and probable grounds are not the defining feature of a non-arbitrary
detention, thus laying the foundation for a brief detention based
upon a lesser standard, the Court went on to articulate an "improper
purpose" test for arbitrariness. The Court stated that "the arrest or
detention was arbitrary, being for quite an improper purpose -
namely to assist in an investigation."113  Under this improper
purpose analysis it appears that a deprivation of liberty in the
context of law enforcement can only be carried out to facilitate an
inevitable prosecution. Liberty cannot be impaired simply to aid the
Duguay, ibid. at 295-99.
112 Ibid. at 297.
113 Ibid. at 296.
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police in investigating an offence that may or may not lead to
charges against the detained individual.
The upshot of both the driving and street encounter cases is
that the concept of arbitrariness embodies two relatively independent
tests: the test of adequate criteria and the test of improper
purpose. These tests may lend themselves to mechanical and
straightforward application, yet they promise more than they can
deliver. The test of adequate criteria is deficient because the courts
never give any indication of what would constitute a constitutionally-
acceptable criteria. The test of improper purpose is simply
unrealistic because it fails to take into account the need for and
common practice of investigatory detention. As a starting point,
these two tests are acceptable, but they need to be reformulated so
as to serve as effective safeguards against arbitrary detention.
III. UNDERSTANDING POLICE POWERS OF DETENTION
A. Investigative Detention
In Canadian law an arrest represents a justifiable intrusion
upon liberty that occurs at the end of an investigation. The arrest
power is premised upon reasonable and probable grounds, as is the
power to initiate proceedings by "the laying [of] an information."
1 14
Accordingly, the arrest must be considered the final stage in the
investigatory process because at this stage the police are presumably
in possession of sufficient grounds to commence criminal
proceedings. However, it must be recognized that being in
possession of reasonable and probable grounds does not guarantee
conviction at trial because the trial proceeds upon the more exacting
burden of reasonable doubt. In some, if not most, cases the police
need to obtain the confirming evidence of a confession to guarantee
success at trial. The confession is the "queen of the evidentiary
114 Crbninal Code, supra, note 80, s. 504.
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chessboard, 17 5 and the police welcome every opportunity that is
provided for its capture.
Although the police exercise their power of arrest at the
completion of the investigation, they are given twenty-four hours, or
longer if the twenty-four hours is impracticable, before which they
must bring the suspect before a judicial officer. Surely, this period
of time is more than ample for the booking of a suspect, and in the
remaining time before appearance in court, the police have an ideal
opportunity to consolidate their case through the obtaining of a
confession. There is no specific authorization for the police to
employ this time for interrogation, and despite the rhetoric of the
right against self-incrimination the police seize the opportunity to
obtain a confession.
In seeming disregard of actual practice, the courts claim that
our law does not recognize an arrest for questioning, 116 and that
police officers do not have "the right to detain somebody for the
purposes of getting them to help with their enquiries."117 In 1984
the House of Lords rationalized this divorce between theory and
practice by holding that the police are not acting improperly if their
sole reason for arresting an individual is to facilitate interrogation. 118
They contended that "the arrest for the purpose of using the
detention to dispel or confirm the reasonable suspicion by
questioning the suspect [is] well established as one of the primary
purposes of detention upon arrest."119 Although the English law on
arrest is less exacting than the Canadian law, for in England a lawful
arrest is premised upon reasonable suspicion and not upon
reasonable and probable grounds, there is little reason to question
the applicability of the holding of the House of Lords to Canadian
law. The upshot is that a deprivation of liberty through arrest can
115 H.R. Uviller, "Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration
of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint" (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137 at 1139.
116 R. v. Reeves (1985). 70 N.S.R. (2d) 165 at 167 (N.S. Prov. Ct).
1 1 7 R. v. Lemsatcf, [1977] 2 All E.R. 835 at 839 (C.A.).
118 Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke, [19841 1 All E.R. 1054 (H.L.), aff'd [1983] 3 All E.R.
526 (C.A).
119 Ibid. at 1059.
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be premised upon the need to interrogate the suspect if, and only
if, the arrest is otherwise lawful in that the police must possess
sufficient grounds to exercise the power to arrest.
120
This qualification that an investigative detention must follow
an otherwise valid arrest explains the Ontario Court of Appeal's
claim in the Duguay case that the police acted upon an improper
purpose in arresting the youths to facilitate their investigation. The
police had exceeded the limits of their power in taking the youths
in a police cruiser to the station because this constituted a
constructive arrest1 21 and because reasonable and probable grounds
were lacking. However, it is misleading if the Court is suggesting
that the police are precluded from taking any action absent
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. In light of the
information received by the police, they would have been derelict in
their duty if they simply disregarded any further investigative action.
Their error was that they subjected the accused to a full-scale
deprivation of liberty instead of taking a less-intrusive investigatory
course of action.
Unfortunately, the Ontario Court of Appeal appears to place
the police on the horns of a dilemma by claiming that a detention
is arbitrary if it is premised upon a need to assist the investigation.
Surely, the police must not be forced into an all or nothing situation
of either exercising a power of arrest or leaving the suspects alone?
Whether or not the Court approves, the police will in most cases
exercise a power of investigatory detention that is subject to ill-
defined limits. The courts must recognize the reality of investigatory
detention and begin the process of regulating the practice so that
street detentions do not end up being non-stationhouse incom-
municado arrests.
Investigatory detention has a well-established historical
pedigree in continental European and in socialist legal jurisdictions.
The powers found in these jurisdictions may exceed acceptable
bounds for Canadian law enforcement; however, they are worth
120 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada recently held that police could conduct a
lineup after a valid arrest and that an arrest does not become unlawful if exercised with an
investigatory purpose in mind: R v. Stomrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241.
121 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), for an analogous case of constructive
arrest.
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noting. In France, the police are empowered to detain in custody
persons who can help them with their inquiries. This period of
detention garde L! vue may last for twenty-four hours subject to a
twenty-four hour extension that may be granted by the procureur 22
In addition, the police have extensive powers of identity control in
which they are allowed to detain anyone for up to four hours to
verify the identity of an individual.1 23 Similar powers are found in
other jurisdictions with variations with respect to the length of
permissible detention. For example, Scotland permits detention for
up to six hours; Ireland permits detention for up to twenty hours,
and the Soviet Union and China permit detention for up to seventy-
two hours.
124
By providing explicit authorization for the practice of
investigatory detention, the legislatures are able to construct
safeguards which may include the keeping of detailed registers, the
provision of medical examinations, the notification of counsel, family,
or friends, and various official warnings to inform the suspect of the
reason for the detention, and the right to remain silent. The
potential for abuse is not eliminated 25 yet it is no small
achievement for law enforcement officials to be compelled to
transform a low-visibility practice into one of official regulation with
stated limitations. The movement from secrecy to official
122 The power to detain is considerably broader for flagrant offences, (that is, those
recently committed) than for ordinary preliminary inquiry. Also, the extensions of the garde
a vue are longer for narcotics trafficking and for matters of national security. For more
detail, see The French Code of Criminal Procedure, rev'd ed., trans. G.L. Kock & R.S. Trage
(Littleton, Colo.: F.B. Rothman, 1988) ss 53-78; K.W. Lidstone & T.L. Early, "Questioning
Freedom: Detention for Questioning in France, Scotland and England" (1982) 31 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 488; B.L. Ingraham, The Siructure of Crimbial Procedure: Laws and Practice of
the Soviet Union, Chbra and tie United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) at 62-63.
123 The French Code of Crimbial Procedure, ibid., ss 78-1 to 78-5; and Lidstone & Early,
ibid at 495-96.
124 Lidstone & Early, ibid. at 497-99; Ingraham. supra, note 122 at 63-65; and D. Walsh,
"The Impact of Antisubversive Laws on the Police Powers and Practices in Ireland: The Silent
Erosion of Individual Freedom" (1989) 62 Temple L.R. 1099.
125 In the Soviet Union, persons may be held for months under exceptional powers
without the ordinary safeguards provided for the usual 72 hour detention: Ingraham, supra,
note 122 at 63. In addition, many have criticized the French garde h vue, sometimes referring
to it as "legitmate torture": see W. Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy"
(1985) 9 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev. 1 at 13.
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recognition and control is best illustrated by developments in
England in the past decade.
Despite the common law abhorrence of investigatory
detention, the British are not strangers to the practice. In response
to terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Army, the British
constructed a draconian scheme of detention without charge that
was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights;126 however,
the Court was careful to suggest that this legislation should be
restricted to terrorist activity. Britain has not heeded this warning
and in 1984, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act127 authorized an
elaborate scheme of investigatory detention. This legislation was a
product of the concern expressed by the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure that existing provisions for interrogation and
investigation upon arrest were uncertain and subject to
manipulation.1 28 It had been noted that "arrested persons were
frequently detained for indefinite periods without notification of the
grounds for detention.
129
Sections 34 to 45 of the new legislation permit detention
without charge after the police have arrested an individual upon
reasonable suspicion. For serious arrestable offences, this detention
may last for thirty-six hours without judicial review and then further
extensions by the Court may be obtained for a period not exceeding
ninety-six hours in total. Several safeguards were established in the
legislation including a requirement of authorization and review by
senior police officials, preparation of written detention records, and
notification to suspects of the reasons for detention. In addition the
Act requires the promulgation of a Code of Practice which, like the
1 2 6 Ireland v. UK (1978), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. A, No. 25, 2 E.H.R.R. 25; McVeigh,
O'Neill and Evans v. UK (Nos 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77) (1981), 5 E.H.R.R. 71.
127 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, s. 66.
128 U.K.,. Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: A Consultative Memorandum by
Sir Phillips (London: H.M.S.O., 1981) paras. 3.96 -3.107 [hereinafter Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure]. See also E.B. Glicksman, 'Reform of English Criminal Procedure -
Fact or Fiction?" (1986) 15 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 1 at 2.
129 Glicksman, ibid.
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previous Judge's Rules,130 provides guidance to the police. The
current Code of Practice contains rules and regulations with respect
to: (1) the right to have concerned individuals informed of the
individual's detention; (2) special provisions for mentally
handicapped and blind suspects; (3) the right to have a solicitor
present during questioning; (4) conditions of detention including
stipulation of rest and eating periods; (5) provision of medical
examination upon request; and (6) cautions to inform the suspect of
his or her right to remain silent.
It should be noted that many of these rules are in essence
non-enforceable, and, in fact, the Code of Practice allows the police
to suspend many of the significant safeguards in cases of perceived
emergency. Nevertheless, the British have taken a practice
previously ungoverned and unruly and subjected it to rigorous
scrutiny.131 The legislative schemes in France, Scotland, the Soviet
Union, and Britain all permit stationhouse detention upon less than
probable cause, and it may be that this onerous form of detention
has no place in Canadian criminal process. However, it must be
recognized that investigatory detention refers not only to these full-
scale deprivations; but it also encompasses briefer and less intrusive
street detentions for investigatory purposes.
Legitimate investigatory detention is permitted in the United
States, and a review of some of the procedures authorized by
various states may give us some indication of the scope and function
of street detention. In 1939, the Unifojrn Ar'est Acd 32 was
promulgated and adopted by some states. It recommended that the
police be empowered to stop and question an individual for whom
the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit an offence. Any person who fails
130 The Judge's Rules were guidelines developed by the judges on the King's Bench in
1912. They were amended in 1918 and in 1964. See the Judges' Rules and Administrative
Directions to the Police, Home Office, Circular No. 31, App. A (1964).
131 However, it appears that stationhouse detention is becoming routine. In the first
half of 1986, 391 applications were made to the court to authorize pre-charge detention and
only eight were refused: J. Clegg, "Warrants of Further Detention" (1988) 132 Solic. J. 278.
132 For example: Unifonn Arrest Act, 941 N.H. Laws 1941 ch. 982; 1941 R.I. Pub. L. ch.
163. See also S. Warner, "The Unifonn Arrest Act" (1942) 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 at 318-19, for
the test of the Act.
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to properly identify himself or herself or to properly "explain his
actions" may be further detained, but the total period of detention
under this provision should not exceed two hours.
The constitutionality of a power of detention on less than
probable cause was not reviewed until the seminal case of Teny in
1968.133 In that case, an officer suspected that a group of
individuals were casing a bank. The officer approached the
individuals on the street, conducted a frisk of the outer clothing, and
discovered the accused in possession of a weapon. In determining
the admissibility of the discovered weapon, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that officers must be permitted to stop and
frisk suspected felons in circumstances in which probable cause is
lacking. They stated that:
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other's safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such yersons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
134
The decision in Teny was considered a reasonable and
practical compromise to the daily dangers faced by officers patrolling
the street; however, the original protective and preventive rationale
for the compromise was forgotten and the Teny decision has
spawned a doctrine of brief investigative detention upon reasonable
and articulable suspicion.135  The power to briefly detain and
possibly frisk an individual has expanded far beyond the investigation
of dangerous felonies that are imminent. The Supreme Court of the
United States has approved investigative stops for possessory
offences and for offences committed some time in the past.136 The
133 Supra, note 5.
134 Ibid. at 30.
135 M. Lippman, "Stop and Frisk: The Triumph of Law Enforcement Over Private
Rights" (1988) 24 Crim. L. Bull. 24; and C. Wiseman, 'The Reasonableness of the
Investigative Detention: An 'Ad Hoc' Constitutional Test" (1984) 67 Marq. L. Rev. 641.
13 6 Adais v. Wlliams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); and U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
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malleability of the doctrine is evident in the expanding list of
offences to which it applies and, further, the indefiniteness of the
notion of brief or temporary has allowed the courts to apply the
doctrine to encounters far removed from the volatile circumstances
found in Terry.
In dealing with detentions that range from twenty minutes 3 7
to ninety minutes1 38 the Court has said that "our cases impose no
rigid time limitation on stops as in Teny,"'139 but that "the brevity of
the invasion ... is an important factor in determining whether the
seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable
suspicion."' 40 Unable to construct a bright-line limitation upon
investigative detention, the Court settled for the balancing test of
"least intrusive means" that requires the reviewing court to ask
whether the "police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly."141 Although
the courts have been unable to provide detailed limits to the power
of investigatory detention, the very fact they have recognized the
power and subjected it to constitutional scrutiny has prompted many
state legislatures to enact enabling legislation..
42
Unfortunately, the current legislation in many states is
elliptical and vague; however, these legislative schemes at least
attempt to place concrete limits upon the exercise of the power.
First, some states place limits upon the type of offences that allow
for investigative street detention.143 Secondly, the legislation may
137 U.S. v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct 1568 (1985) [hereinafter Sharpe].
138 U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) [hereinafter Place].
139 Sharpe, supra, note 137 at 1575.
140 Place, supra, note 138 at 709.
141 Sharpe, supra, note 137 at 1575.
142 For relevant state legislation, see Dix, supra, note 21 at 862-63. For a detailed and
insightful example of recommended legislation, see 3. Lajota, Project on Law Enforcement
Policy and Rulemadng; Model Rules Stop and Frisk (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation,
1974). This proposal covers what constitutes reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, what
warnings to be given to stopped suspects, the effect of a refusal to cooperate, and the
procedures and safeguards to employ during a frisk.
143 For example, The American Law Institute, The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure (1975) [hereinafter The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure] requires that the
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prescribe the permissible length of an investigatory detention! 44
Thirdly, the legislation may specify the permitted location for the
questioning and whether the suspect may be moved from the
location at which he or she was stopped.1 45 Fourthly, the legislation
may prescribe a series of admonitions or warnings to apprise the
suspect of his or her rights and legal status during questioning.
146
Finally, the legislation may detail the amount of force that can be
used by an officer to effect a detention.147  It should also be noted
that some states have enacted provisions that allow the police to
obtain judicial orders or warrants to compel a suspect to attend at
a designated location for various non-testimonial identification
procedures.
148
offence be one "involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or
damage to property": section 110.2(1)(c). Virginia requires that the offence be a felony or
criminal possession of a concealed weapon: Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-83 (1990). See also Dix,
supra, note 21 at 870-71.
144 For example, The Model Code of Pre-Araigminent Procedure, ibid states that a
detention may not last longer than twenty minutes: section 110.2 (5)(a)(ii). Arkansas permits
fifteen minutes: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-429(a) (1977). Montana permits thirty minutes: Mont.
Code Ann. § 46-5-402(4) (1983). Delaware permits two hours: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 §
1902(c) (1979). New Hampshire permits 4 hours: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:2 (1974). See
also Dix, supra, note 21 at 885-86.
145 For example, Florida legislation states that the detention "shall not extend beyond
the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof": Fla. Star. Ann. §
901.151(3) (1985). Wisconsin requires the detention to be "in the vicinity where the person
was stopped": Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.24 (1985). In Virginia, the police must "detain a person
in a public place": Va. Code Ann. § 19.2 - 83 (1990). See also Dix, supra, note 21 at 896-
97.
146 For example, The Model Code of Pre-Amraigninent Procedure, supra, note 146, requires
that the suspect be told that he or she will be released after twenty minutes and that there
is no legal obligation to answer questions: sections 110.2(5)(a)(ii) and 110.1(2). The Montana
legislation requires the officer to identify himself or herself as an officer and to inform the
suspect that the stop is not an arrest but a temporary detention and that upon completion of
the investigation the person will be released unless arrested: Mont. Code. Ann. § 46-5-402(3)
(1983). See also Dix, supra, note 21 at 900-901.
147 Most statutes are silent or allow the use of any reasonably necessary force short of,
or including, deadly force: Dix, supra, note 21 at 902-3.
148 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-271 to 15A-280 (1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905
(1978). In Canada, a dearth of authority on the permissible powers to compel investigative
tests prompted the Law Reform Commission to recommend a series of enabling rules: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, hIvestigative Teyts (Working Paper 34) (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1984).
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In conclusion, it appears that investigative detention is
commonly part of the arsenal of police powers in many jurisdictions.
Once recognized it can be regulated. Canadian courts should not
deem a detention to be arbitrary simply on the basis that it was
exercised for an investigatory purpose. Rather, the courts should
acknowledge the need for investigatory detention and then
commence to articulate the standards and criteria that distinguish an
arbitrary detention from a legitimate detention short of arrest.
B. Probable Cause, Profiles, and the Poor Law
The characterization of a stop or detention as arbitrary
should have little to do with the investigatory intentions of the state
official. As the Supreme Court of Canada has noted,149 it is the
absence of governing criteria that makes the detention
constitutionally suspect. However, one must question whether a
criterion which is itself arbitrary or irrational, would pass
constitutional muster. For example, in the context of vehicle stops
it is arguable that the Supreme Court of Canada would have still
found random vehicle stops to be violative of section 9 of the
Charter even if a criterion such as stopping every third blue car was
in operation. The direction to stop every third blue car does
eliminate the danger of discriminatory stops, but it does not address
the related danger of indiscriminate intrusion. The third blue car
criterion is neutral, yet its lack of relation to the commission of any
offence makes this criterion as arbitrary as the complete absence of
criteria.
In equating non-arbitrariness with the presence of governing
criteria, the Court must have had in mind criteria that are somehow
connected with the objective of preventing or detecting crime.
Traditionally, the law has never required detailed criteria for
intrusion, but rather has been content to capture the spirit of
regulated intrusion by the general formula of reasonable and
probable grounds. The general rule of thumb is that "the state's
interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the
1 4 9 Hifsky, supra, note 92.
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individual's interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-
based probability replaces suspicion."150 This reference to credibly-
based probability is the essence of the Supreme Court of Canada's
objective criterion for a reasonable search under section 8 of the
Charter. However, section 9 of the Charter does not proscribe
unreasonable detentions but only arbitrary ones and, by definition,
the objective criterion must be somewhat relaxed in this context.
In order to avoid an attribution of arbitrary conduct, the
state official must be operating under a set of criteria that, at
minimum, bears some relationship to a reasonable suspicion of crime
but not necessarily to a credibly-based probability of crime.15 1  The
structural relationship between sections 8 and 9 of the Charter
ineluctably leads to the adoption of the American position on
seizures of the person: a full-scale arrest (a seizure) must be
supported by probable cause,152 whereas a temporary stop (a
detention) need only be supported by a reasonable and articulable
suspicion.153 Unfortunately, the clarity and simplicity of this two-
tiered structure is undercut by the inherent vagueness of formulas
such as "reasonable and probable grounds" and "reasonable
suspicion."
The police may acquire information or leads in one of two
ways. First, they may directly observe activity from which they can
draw inferences of criminal activity. Secondly, they may receive
information from individuals concerning observed criminal activity.
In the latter situation, the police are entitled to act if the informant
150Hunter v. Southain, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 167.
151 This appears to be the premise of tile Ontario Court of Appeal in Duguay, supra,
note 109. The premise remains implicit because the majority mistakenly assumed that the
detention was arbitrarily exercised for investigatory purposes.
152 The Ontario Court of Appeal correctly pointed out that the American standard of
"probable cause" is synonymous with the Canadian standard of "reasonable and probable
cause": R. v. Debot (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 at 219 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd (1989), 73 C.R.
(3d) 129 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Debot].
153 However, the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan Department,
supra, note 108, suggests that minimally intrusive seizures do not need reasonable suspicion
if the state has a pressing interest for the detention.
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and his or her information is trustworthy and reliable.15 4  The
acquisition of information from informants will not be discussed
further because most street encounters arise from spontaneous and
direct observation by the state official whereas the informant
scenario, though problematic in many regards, usually occurs in a
more relaxed and reflective setting that allows the officer to consult
with other officers before acting. Accordingly, we will assess the
practical implementation of the criteria of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion in the context of the officer directly observing
conduct on the streets.
In this scenario the variety of suspicious facts and
circumstances police may witness is nearly infinite, but most fall into
one of four categories: 1 5 (1) conduct resembling crime; (2) conduct
that appears to reflect consciousness of guilt; (3) characteristics of
the actor; and (4) the environment in which the actor is observed. 6
An officer must take these facts and circumstances and perform the
unenviable intellectual exercise of determining whether these facts
amount to sufficient grounds for intrusion. It has been said that
probable cause is established where "the facts within their [the
officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offence has been, or is
being, committed. ' 5 7 The standard is no more than an exhortation
to caution and as Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of
Canada said: "the expression [reasonable and probable cause], no
doubt, comprises something more than mere surmise, but
determining with any useful measure of precision what it means
beyond that poses intractable problems both for the police and the
courts."1
58
154 For the relevant standard of evaluating informants' tips, see R. v. Pastro (1988), 42
C.C.C. (3d) 485 (Sask. C.A.) and Dcbot, supra, note 152.
155 Johnson, supra, note 28 at 218.
156 Johnson, ibid. at 218-23, discusses the content of these factors.
157 Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160 at 175-76 (1949).
158 R. v. Landry (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 26 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Landiy].
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The intractable problem of defining reasonable and probable
grounds has led the courts to declare that "probable cause is a fluid
concept"159 and that "the standard to be met is one of reasonable
probability,"16° without any further indication of how the officer can
instantiate "the vagueness of the proposed test."1 61 Ultimately, the
courts defer to the experience or expertise of the officer as "a
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions ... inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person."
1 62
Probable cause may be the threshold criterion for legitimate state
intrusion, but it is a standard that defies rational evaluation.
Knowing the difficulties inherent in the application of the
probable cause standard, one can safely assume that the more
relaxed standard of "reasonable suspicion" will attack even graver
problems of definition. The most elaborate portrait of this standard
that the u.s. Supreme Court has been able to draw is as follows:
Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they
fall short of providing clear guidelines dispositive of the myriad factual situations
that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the
circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken into account. Based upon that
whole picture the detaining officer must have a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity ... Finally, the
evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis
by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. 6 3
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion refer to distinctive
modes of evaluating facts and circumstances as observed on the
street. Probable cause may be a reference to a preponderance of
evidence, either a more probable than not standard or merely a
159 Illinois v. Gates, 103A S. Ct. 2317 at 2329 (1983) [hereinafter Gates].
160 Debot, supra, note 152 at 219.
161 Landqy, supra, note 158 at 25.
162 U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 at 418 (1981).
163 Ibid. at 417-18. British judges have stated that suspicion is a state of conjecture or
surmise in absence of proof and that it arises at or near the starting point of an investigation
of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end: Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam, [1969]
3 All E.R. 1626 (P.C.). However, the English pronouncements provide little help because they
"still use such terms as 'reasonable suspicion,' 'reasonable and probable cause,' and 'reasonable
and probable cause for suspicion' interchangeably": J. Grano, "Probable Cause and Common
Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gate' (1984) 17 Mich. J.L. Reform 465 at 488.
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substantial possibility standard.16 4 Whatever standard is chosen for
probable cause, the term reasonable suspicion triggers a less exacting
standard. Professor Lafave claims that in the American experience
street stops require a substantial possibility of guilt, whereas an
arrest is not permitted unless guilt is more probable than not.
165
The nature and intrusiveness of the investigatory activity determines
the standard of certainty of guilt that must be met before the officer
can exercise his or her authority.
Establishing distinctive and abstract standards of evaluation
for probable cause and for reasonable suspicion does not assist the
officer on the street in determining the legitimate point of intrusion.
Accordingly, attempts have been made to flesh out the factors that
should be considered in weighing whether or not this point of
intrusion has been reached.1 66 It has been recognized that not all
factors must be left to the subjective weighing of the officer; and
that "when common factors recur across cases, the possibility arises
that policy decisions can be made about their place in a probable
cause or reasonable suspicion equation. 167  A stated policy
mandates a presumptive weighing of certain factors that have been
shown to have predictive capabilities.
A stated policy for determining probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is commonly found in the creation of law enforcement
profiles of criminality. The best-known profile is that of the
notorious drug courier profile though many other profiles are in
use.168  Savage critiques have been made of the drug courier
164 Grano, ibid., argues that the courts employ the substantial possibility standard in
applying probable cause.
165 W.R. Lafave, "Street Encounters' and the Constitution: Tcny, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond" (1968) 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40 at 57, 73-74.
166 See the detailed list of factors in the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and
Rulemakng, supra, note 143 at 30-32.
167 j. Acker, "Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: The Fourth Amendment, Probable
Cause and Reasonable Suspicion" (1987) 23 Crim. L. Bull. 49 at 52.
168 In the U.S., there are hijacking profiles, drug smuggling vessel profiles, stolen car
profiles, stolen truck profiles, alimentary-canal profiles, battering parent profiles, poacher
profiles, and serial killer profiles: C. Becton, "Tie Drug Courier Profile: 'All Seems Infected
that Th' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye' (1987) 65 N.C.L. Rev. 417
at 423-25.
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profile 69 as it is ineffective,170 irrational, and incoherent. It is
incoherent because most extant profiles list every conceivable factor,
whether contradictory or mutually exclusive.
Although the drug courier profile in Canada remains hidden
from public view,17' it is clear that it suffers from the same flaws as
the American of being overinclusive and incoherent as does the
American profile. An examination of a 1983 Canadian Customs
Intelligence Profile reveals that the following factors will attract
official attention:
breaks in eye contact when being questioned, dilation of the pupils, rapid blinking
or side to side movement of the eyes, tenseness in the lips or licking of the lips,
loss of facial colour, arching of the eyebrows, yawning, lowering of the head and
pulling in the chin, pulsing of the carotid artery in the neck, bobbing of the adams
apple, visible perspiration, tilting the body forward, turning the body away from the
officer, rigidity or stiffness of the body, pointing away from body with the hands,
putting a hand near the mouth while speaking, touching or rubbing the nose while
speaking, playing with their clothing or jewellery, closing of the hands, patting or
ruffling the hair, pulling on an ear, scratching, shifting weight from one foot to the
other, tapping the foot, shuffling the feet, flexing the knees, loss of coordination or
lack of precision in movements 
...172
Many other factors relating to ticket and passport information and
appearance are listed and the profile notes that "the officer must
note reactions in clusters, that is several indicators of stress being
present." The upshot is that this profile could apply to each and
every person travelling through a Canadian airport, or, alternatively,
it could only narrowly apply to a traveller manifesting the symptoms
of rabies.
The project of trying to construct a list of factors to be
weighed in determining probable cause or reasonable suspicion is
169 For example, Becton, ibid.; and P. Greenberg, "Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall
and Reid: Analysing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause" (1981) 19 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 49.
170 As one might expect, the number of false positives are high. According to one
study, the drug courier profile is effective in thirty percent of the cases, thus seven out of ten
people were exposed to a needless intrusion: Murphy, supra, note 47 at 239-40.
171 An exception is R. v. Gladstone (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 151 (B.C.C.A.) at 168-69,
which reproduced a portion of the profile.
172 I do not believe this is a public document - it came into my possession by
happenstance.
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doomed to failure. No listing of factors can adequately capture the
"totality of circumstance" approach required by the courts.
173
Despite admonitions from the courts that the approach to probable
cause is one of practical common-sense, it must be borne in mind
that an exhortation to common-sense can never produce a clearly
definable set of factors that constitute probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. The British Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
recognized the futility of trying to capture "practical reason" in a
formula in their rejection of a recommendation to codify the content
of their accepted criterion of reasonable suspicion:
[W]e acknowledge the risk that the criterion [reasonable suspicion] could be loosely
interpreted, and have considered the possibility of trying to find some agreed upon
standards which could form the grounds of reasonable suspicion and could be set
out in statute or code of practice ... "[W]e have concluded that the variety of
circumstances that would be covered makes this impracticable.'d
74
The inability to codify and instantiate the standard for
legitimate state intervention does not mean that the courts must be
content with, and restricted to, a post hoc evaluation of a police
officer's purported grounds for intrusion. Practical reasoning can
take one of two forms.175 The first form, the balance of reasons,
requires the decision-maker to take into account all relevant reasons
and then act in accordance with the determination of which reasons
are to be afforded the greatest weight. This is the form of practical
reasoning that is assumed to lie at the heart of the probable cause
determination. This is also the form of reasoning that defies
codification. A second form of practical reasoning, called
exclusionary reasoning, employs second-order reasons that pre-empt
the balance of reasons approach; that is, one is acting in accordance
with an exclusionary reason if one has a pre-determined reason to
forgo the usual balancing and weighing of all relevant reasons. A
173 This approach was coined in Gates, supra, note 159, and adopted by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Debot, supra, note 153, and Church of Scientology v. R. (1987), 31 C.C.C.
(3d) 449.
174 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, supra, note 129, paras. 3.24-3.25.
175 The following analysis is drawn from 3. Raz, "Reasons for Action, Decision, and
Norms" in . Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Practical
reasoning may comprise more than two distinct cognitive processes; however, Raz's two-
tiered analysis is sufficient for this paper.
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person usually decides whether or not to make a financial
investment based upon a careful balance of reason. This same
individual, however, may operate under a rule of thumb not to
invest money if sick, intoxicated, or heavily in debt. These rules of
thumb are exclusionary reasons that operate by bypassing the usual
balance of reasons.
It may be that effective and meaningful regulation of the
concept of probable cause or reasonable suspicion may require
recognition of the determinative role played by exclusionary reasons.
In this context the articulation of exclusionary reasons must be
grounded in an appreciation of the mischief or evil that a
constitutional proscription against arbitrary detention is designed to
prevent. It is easy to say that the the right is designed to prevent
indiscriminate and discriminatory intrusions, but a true understanding
of this objective only emerges when we examine the historical
record.
This record can provide us with concrete examples of
arbitrary state practice that must be prevented from recurring.
Much can be gained from an examination of the historical treatment
of vagrants under the early poor laws and under more recent
vagrancy statutes. These laws operated by allowing the police to
exercise a power of detention that was directed at an entire social
class, regardless of any particularized suspicion of criminality. It is
submitted that probable cause or reasonable suspicion should be
constrained by using exclusionary reasoning that would prevent the
re-emergence of a vagrancy-type approach to law enforcement.
In Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown,176 the author lists six
factors justifying an arrest upon reasonable suspicion. In addition to
well accepted factors such as "being found in such circumstances as
induce a strong presumption of guilt" and "the behaving of one's self
in such a manner as betrays a consciousness of guilt," Hawkins
includes as a relevant factor "the living of an idle, vagrant, and
disorderly life, without having any visible means to support it."177
This unusual reference reflects the entrenched common law practice
176 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 1716-1721 (London: Professional Books, 1973).
177 This summary of Hawkins's list of factors is taken from: J. Weber, "'The Birth of
Probable Cause" (1982) 11 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 155 at 162.
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of law enforcement that was directed at a supposedly-distinct social
class, commonly referred to as vagrants.
The vagrancy concept in English law originated as the
punitive side of the poor laws and its attempt to ameliorate the
social blight of indigence.178 The vagrancy concept developed in
three distinct stages.1 79 The initial stage, from 1349 to 1547,
addressed the problems created by the breakdown of feudal
structures by confining labourers to stated places of residence and
to fixed wages. Accordingly, wandering or vagrancy became a crime,
as the vagrant was viewed as a runaway slave. The economic
objectives of the first stage eventually gave way to the objective of
preventing criminal activity. In the second stage, from 1547 to 1824,
the vagrant was seen as a probable criminal because idleness was
perceived to be a root cause of criminal activity. The vagrant was
no longer simply an individual who appeared indigent and homeless,
but included a whole range of social actors deemed to be living on
the fringes of criminality. In the late sixteenth century, the list of
legislatively-deemed vagrants included persons "feigning to have
knowledge in physiognomy, palmistry, or other crafty science[;] ... all
fencers, bearwards, common players and minstrels; all jugglers,
tinkers and petty chapmen[;] ... and all persons pretending
themselves to be Egyptians. 180 As absurd as this list may appear to
modem sensibilities, the so-called "vagrants problem" was a solemn
and brutal affair with the state administering whippings and
brandings to those caught within the vagrant net.
The final stage in the vagrancy story began with the
enactment of the Vagrancy Act of 1824.181 Since the enactment of
this legislation there has been an attempt to move away from status
178 For an account of the various facets of the poor law, see L. Radzinowicz, A History
of the English Crininal Law and Its Administration From 1750, vol. 4 (London: Stevens, 1968)
. 1 &2.
179 This three-tiered historical overview is summarized in G. Dubin & R. Robinson, 'he
Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality" (1962) 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102 at 104-8. The authors rely upon J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criindal
Law of England, vol. 3 (London: MacMillan, 1883) at 266-75.
180 Stephen, ibid. at 272.
181 (U.K.) 5 Geo. 4, c. 83.
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criminality to conduct criminality. The legislation created three
classes of vagrants: (1) idle and disorderly persons, (2) rogues and
vagrants, and (3) incorrigible rogues with each classification being
premised upon the commission of a designated act. The courts were
careful to ensure that vagrancy was seen as nothing more than a
nonsubstantive appellation and that the legislation would operate
so as to only capture specific designated conduct.18 2 This movement
away from the status criminality is still underway and is reflected in
various contemporary legislative reforms. For example, in Canada,
the enactment of the Young Offenders Act 83 was in part prompted
by growing discontent with the previous regime in which a youth
could be classified as a juvenile delinquent based upon status
conditions such as immorality or incorrigibility.
18 4
The earlier stage of vagrancy as status criminality came under
attack because of its apparent inconsistency with developing
principles of substantive criminal law. This inconsistency is
summarized as follows:
The second basic theoretical distinction between conduct criminality and status
criminality is that the latter requires no evidence of actual causation. Recognition
of the element of causation is limited to a presumption that the necessary certainty
of cause and effect exists in the relationship between the status group and the
anticipated future criminal conduct. This presumption does not conform to the
basic proposition that there must be some "rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Status criminality substitutes suspicion
causation for actual causation. Suspicion causation does not require that "degree
of certainty, regularity, uniformity and predicability" necessary to demonstrate a
causal relation. Until one who has assumed a proscribed status has in fact engaged
in criminal conduct, the law at most can make only a qualified guess as to whether
a member of the status group is a potential criminal. Under these circumstances,
sanctions are meaningless.1
l &
Many American states have vagrancy statutes and in the
early constitutional challenges to these statutes the primary concern
that led to invalidation was the substantive claim stated above. In
182 For example, Ledwith v. Roberts (1936), [1937] 1 K.B. 232 (C.A.).
183 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1.
184 For a brief history of the reform, see R. Fox, '"The Treatment of Juveniles in
Canadian Criminal Law," in A.N. Doob & E.L. Greenspan, eds, Perspectives in Criminal Law
(Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1985) at 149-85.
185 Dubin & Robinson, supra, note 179 at 118-19.
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1939, the u.s. Supreme Court struck down a statute that penalized
"any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of a gang of two or more persons. '186  The Court found
the statute violative of the due process clause 87 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of its inherent vagueness and the fact that "the
challenged provision condemns no act or omission."188  The u.s.
Supreme Court later invalidated a Florida vagrancy ordinance that
captured many of the same social actors who had been deemed to
be vagrants under sixteenth century English law.1 89 Unlike the
earlier decision, the Court seemed less concerned with the
theoretical. problems of substantive law and more concerned with the
procedural implications of a vagrancy law.
The Court commented that wandering, loafing, and loitering
may be indicia of criminal activity but they are also "historically part
of the amenities of life" and "have been in part responsible for
giving our people the feeling of independence and self-
confidence."19 The problem with the vagrancy ordinance has little
to do with the status of criminality, but rather its vagueness
"encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."
191
Substantive defects in a criminal offence may have procedural
implications and in this scenario the vague attribution of criminality
to individuals of a designated status leads to an overly-broad grant
of discretionary power to law enforcement officials:
186 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 at 456 (1939).
187 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV [hereinafter Fourteenth Amendment].
188 ]bid at 458.
189 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) [hereinafter Papachrstou]. The
ordinance provided: "Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd,
wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaining houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants."
190 Ibi. at 164.
191 Ibi. at 162.
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Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance - poor people,
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to comport themselves
according to the life style deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the
courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the
discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for
' harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure" ... It results in a regime in
which the poor and the unpopular are I~gnitted to "stand on a public sidewalk ...
only at the whim of any police officer.'
This history of vagrancy law in Canada reflects a similar
concern with arbitrary law enforcement resulting from status-based
designations that lead to arbitrary law enforcement. The first
Criminal Code of 1892 contained a vagrancy offence 193 that was
similar to the conduct-oriented formulation of the English Vagrancy
Act of 1824; however, various amendments culminated in a
subsection that proscribed innocuous activities such as wandering and
indigence:
164. (1) Every one commits vagrancy who
(a) not having any apparent means of support is found wandering abroad or
trespassinN and does not, when required, justify his presence in a place where he
is found.'
4
In 1972, the vagrancy concept was for the most part repealed and
replaced by a provision proscribing soliciting for the purpose of
prostitution 95 The decision to replace the status offence of an
unjustified presence with a conduct offence of solicitation was
largely premised upon the procedural implications of the substantive
defect of vagueness. In introducing the amending Bill, it was noted
that "the vagueness of section 164 allows selective and discriminatory
enforcement against just such a minority without any proof of
particular harm ... [and that] it has now become an anachronistic
192 Ibid. at 170. See also, Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct 1855 (1983), for a similar
approach to a California statute.
193 Criminal Code of Canada, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 207.
194 Criminal Code of Canada, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 164.
195 Crminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13.
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survival of a past age, unjustified in principle, and abusive in
application."'
9 6
Historically, the approach to crime prevention consisted of
the building of "nets making easy the roundup of so-called
undesirables. 197  Dragnet arrests of social outcasts was the
procedural form of choice. The Criminal Code provision allowing
for the issue of a special search warrant for bawdy houses still
reflects this anachronistic procedural form.1 98 This provision allows
for the issuance of a search warrant merely upon a written report of
an officer and the warrant authorizes the seizure of all persons
found in the bawdy house. These "found-ins" are to be taken to a
Justice of the Peace for the purpose of a compulsory examination
under oath.1 99 The Law Reform Commission of Canada has noted
that:
[This] warrant is traceable to a number of measures instituted in the mid-
eighteenth century to deal with the "wandering poor" and regulate activities thought
to inspire criminal tendencies ... These were essentially arrest warrants; persons
rounded up in the search were brought before justices and examined as to their
means of livelihood.
2 00
This dragnet approach to crime prevention was the subject
of constant criticism that began in the eighteenth century. It has
been noted that "Hale made clear that a general warrant upon a
complaint of robbery 'to apprehend all persons suspected' was
void.,201  It is also commonly understood that the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure was
196 Canada, H.C., Debates, at 6646-47 (11 June 1971). See also comments by Minister
of Justice, Canada, H.C., Debates, at 1699 (27-28 April 1972): "Here we have an offence
which has been applied differently to the rich and to the poor of society and we move against
this difference in application."
1 9 7 Papachristou, supra, note 189 at 171.
198 Section 199 of the Criminal Code, supra, note 80, formerly section 181, was struck
down because it violated section 8 of the Charter: Re Vella (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 513 (Ont.
H.C.).
199 The compulsory examination was repealed: S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 12.
200 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Police Powers: Search and Seizure in Criminal
Law Enforcement (Working Paper 30) (Ottawa: The Commission, 1983) at 59.
201 Grano, supra, note 163 at 482.
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a response to the mischief of general warrants and writs of
assistance,202 but it must be remembered that most general search
warrants contained authorization for a general dragnet form of
arrest.203 Accordingly, the eighteenth century cases that condemned
the general search warrant implicitly deprecated the general dragnet
arrest warrant. Both these warrants are equally objectionable in that
they bestow unbridled discretion upon law enforcement officials.
The history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that a
requirement of reasonableness was imposed to guard against
indiscriminate intrusions. The danger of indiscriminate intrusion was
to be averted by the requirement that state officials have probable
cause of reasonable suspicion of criminality before intruding.
However, the historical record is only complete when one takes into
account the ebb and flow of vagrancy law. This part of the
historical record tells us that although a probable cause requirement
may have been developed to curtail indiscriminate intrusion, it must
be supplemented by the requirement that probable cause was
directed to suspicious activity and not to the attributes or status of
the person. Status-based intrusions give rise to a separate evil -
that of discriminatory intrusion. Therefore, a complete picture of
the historical record suggests that the reasonableness requirement
should safeguard against indiscriminate intrusion and the non-
arbitrary requirement should supplement the protection by
safeguarding against discriminatory law enforcement. Properly
understood, the right to be free from arbitrary detention is not only
a right that secures freedom from irrational and capricious intrusion,
but is also a safeguard to ensure that police-community relations do
not become divisive because of policing decisions to target
individuals who do not fit into the majority mainstream mould.
202 J. Landynski, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional
Interpretation (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966); N. lasson, The History and Development
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Press, 1937).
203 For example, Money v. Leach (1765) 97 E.R. 1075 (K.B.).
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C. The Police Function Revisited
Freedom from arbitrary intrusion can only be achieved if
state officials are barred from intruding in the absence of a specific
suspicion of criminal activity. Preventive police action should not be
allowed when it is motivated by a suspicion of criminal activity
solely, or primarily, based upon the personal attributes of the target.
The enforcement of law should be construed literally and narrowly
and should not be expanded into a practice of "seizure of social
parasites."204 Law enforcement may incidentally affect the ordering
of social relations, but its primary purpose should not be the social
control of marginalized individuals.
The past 150 years has seen a movement away from an
authorized regime of control and surveillance of vagrants and others
perceived as social undesirables; however, the legislatively-authorized
practice of social control may have been repealed only to be
replaced by the covert substitute of aggressive preventive patrol.
The state will not readily abandon its reliance upon policing as a
form of social control, and notwithstanding the movement away from
overt social control in Anglo-American jurisdictions, it can be seen
that continental European states still retain many vestiges of police
control of marginalized individuals. In France we see the
strengthening of identity control legislation. 205  In Italy we find
extensive surveillance and control of ex-prisoners and vagabonds.
20 6
In fact, Article 5(1)(e) of the European Convention on Human
Rights207 recognizes the continuing state practice of social control of
the marginalized by authorizing deprivations of liberty through the
lawful detention of vagrants.
20 8
204 Radzinowicz, supra, note 178 at 87.
205 Lidstone & Early, supra, note 122 at 495-96.
206 For a discussion of tite extensive control of ex-cons in Italy, see S. Glueck,
Continental Police Practice in the Fonnative Years (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1974) at 35-38.
207 The Council of Europe, European Convention on Hwnan Rights: Collected Teats,
(The Netherlands: Martnus Nijhoff, 1987) at 6.
208 For an interesting case in which the European Court of Human Rights limited the
ability of the Italian state to place a suspected mafia member in exile on an island, see
Guzzardi v. Italy (1980), Eur. Court H.R. Ser. A., No. 39, 3 E.H.R.R. 333. The Court
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The Anglo-American system of law enforcement operates
upon assumptions that may be different from the European
approach. Although it may be honoured more in its breach, we
have espoused a principle in which "general police intervention
should be tied to proscriptions upon conduct rather than to status
and capacity. Our system of criminal justice is act-oriented."20 9
Accordingly, "arbitrary searches, seizures, arrests and
detentions are in this light seen to be those predicated upon
considerations which are not event-specific."210 In order to respect
privacy and dignity, and to prevent an overbearing and destructive
state presence, Canada has chosen a system in which state intrusion
must be event-specific rather than panoptic. The basic idea is that
"intrusive police activity should not be diffuse and unfocused, or
even generally (panoptically) focused. The principal assertion is that
the police should not be permitted to roam at large with the power
to conduct a wholesale inquisition in society."
211
If the right to be free from arbitrary detention is rightfully
perceived as a command to the police to honour the event-specific
limitation on state intrusion, then it should have a noticeable impact
upon the police function. The implicit effect of section 9 of the
Charter is to favour reactive policing over proactive policing. It is
clear that proactive mobilization of the police (that is, police action
that is self-initiated and not in response to a complaint from a
member of the public) provides the greatest opportunity for the
police to undertake intrusions based upon the personal attributes
of the individual.
212
Preventive police activity such as a visible police presence or
the cultivation of harmonious community relations would not be
adopted a narrow interpretation of the term "vagrant" to avoid invoking the exception allowing
for arbitrary detention of vagrants.
209 Cohen, supra, note 11 at 637.
210 Ibid at 638.
211 Ibid at 639.
212 For a discussion of empirical studies showing that proactive policing is usually
targeted against persons of lower socio-economic status, see Ericson, supra, note 12 at 73-
88, and P. Solomon, Criminal Justice Policy: From Research to Refonn (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1983) at 7-20.
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affected by an expansive interpretation of section 9 of the Charter.
However, proactive policing in the form of investigative stops should
be dramatically curtailed because this practice borders upon social
control of the marginalized. As Ericson has noted:
Constant proactive stops are a not-so-subtle way of reminding marginal people of
the "order of things." Here, symbolic authority is paramount: for this reason,
demeanour becomes a very important variable. The person deemed "respectable-
respectful" will nearly always avoid the full range of actions, while his opposite must
endure personal and property searches, detention for the CPIC checks, and the
possibility of minor charges as an "ordering device" ... In the jurisdiction we studied,
the target is lower-class young persons ("pukers") who may be occasionally involved
in drug and property-related offences and who appear to some to be offensive.
Regardless of the community, some group will always be targeted.
213
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently suggested that
proactive policing must be restricted so as to ensure that individuals
are not intruded upon solely because of their personal
characteristics. In R. v. Mack,2 4 the Court analyzed the most
proactive type of police practice commonly known as entrapment.
In approving the defence of entrapment when the police overstep
the boundaries of legitimate law enforcement, the Court stated that
entrapment will exist if the police target an individual without having
a reasonable suspicion that the individual is already engaged in
criminal activity. Accordingly, the Court found that entrapment
arose where the police target an individual without reasonable
suspicion. Accordingly, the Court has restricted undercover police
infiltration so that it is event-specific and not a practice of "random
virtue-testing."
215
It may be argued that all the judiciary can do to prevent
status-based proactive policing is to articulate an exclusionary
213 Ericson, ibid. at 200-201. For a critique of Ericson's view of policing as social
control, see P. Russell, 'Tie Political Theory of Contrology," in Doob & Greenspan, supra,
note 184.
214 (1989), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513 (S.C.C.).
215 Ibid at 552. The Court also commented that an individual's "past criminal conduct
is relevant only if it can be linked to other factors leading the police to a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is engaged in a criminal activity." Although targetting based on prior
criminality may not be as offensive as reliance upon personal characteristics, it still generates
harassment and hampers the offender's re-integration into society. For a case in which a
court reprimanded the police for launching a wiretap investigation based on criminal
reputation, see . v. An'iv (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 369 (Ont. H.C.).
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approach of practical reasoning 1 6 to the definition of probable
cause and reasonable suspicion. A model definition of this approach
can be found in the recently enacted British Code of Practice.217
Annex B of the Code provides a five-part definition of reasonable
grounds of suspicion which includes the following:
3. Reasonable suspicion cannot be supported on the basis simply of a higher than
average chance that the person has committed or is committing an offence, for
example because he belongs to a group within which offenders of a certain kind are
relatively common, or because of a combination of factors such as these. For
example, a person's colour of itself can never be a reasonable ground for suspicion.
The mere fact alone that a person is carrying a particular kind of property or is
dressed in certain way or has a certain hairstyle is likewise not of itself sufficient.
Nor is the fact that a person is known to have a previous conviction for unlawful
possession of an article.
2 18
This type of restrictive definition of probable cause may serve a
precatory purpose, but in itself, can do little to constrain the police.
The judiciary can, and must, do more to restrict the police function
to event-specific intrusions. Section 9 of the Charter must be
construed and implemented in a manner that prevents panoptic
intrusion and covert social control through policing. Anthony
Amsterdam notes that "in an age where our shrinking privacy and
liberty would otherwise be enjoyable only at the sufferance of
expanding, militaristically organized bodies of professional police, the
Fourth Amendment demands that an independent judiciary play a
direct, strong role in their regulation.
219
In the realm of politics and law reform, the constant chatter
is about police-community relations and police hiring practice. Little
is ever said or done about proper training and instruction with
reference to street encounters. In December 1988, the Solicitor-
General of Ontario established a Task Force to inquire into the
mounting tension between the police and the visible minorities in
216 See, supra, note 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach.
217 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, s. 66; (Code of Practice) S.I.
1988/1200.
218 U.K., Home Office, Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning
of Persons by Police Officers (London: H.M.S.O., 1985).
219 A. Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment" (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349 at 439.
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Toronto.220 Similar task forces had examined the issue in 1974,
1975, 1977, 1979, and 1980 and all of the reports suggested that
increased hiring and promotion of visible minorities within the police
force would placate the growing racial tension. The Task Force in
1988 realized that its predecessors had all recommended the same
solution with no apparent success, yet, it also chose to flog the dead
horse. In addition to its recommendation to increase minority
hiring, the Task Force did speak of proper training in race relations;
however, the form of race relations training is not specified, except
for the abstract objective of changing "the various attitudes which
produce racism in all of us."
221
It is surprising and perhaps even insulting that law reform
with respect to police-community relations remains stuck with the
idea that more equitable employment practices and consciousness-
raising training sessions will ameliorate police-community tensions.
These goals are laudable but they can never be more than a
"bandaid" because it is clear that street encounters between the
public and the police are the prime breeding ground for distrust and
hatred. If no attempt is made to structure and confine police
discretion on the street, then there will always be the danger that
minority groups will be needlessly harassed. The police need to be
trained in the detection of criminal activity on the street that is
based upon clues and indicia that are not status-based; they need to
be trained on how to conduct street encounters with civility, and a
monitoring system must be established to determine whether the
training is having any impact. This type of reform is sorely needed,
but it is this type of reform that the political players ignore because
of its intrusiveness on the day to day functioning of the police.
When the legislative branch of government is caught in the
deepest inertia, it may be legitimate for the judiciary to jump into
the fray. The objective is for the judiciary to design rules and
220 Tie Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: The Task Force,
1989) (Chair C. Lewis) at 1.
221 Ibid at 94. The proposed reform to the Police Act in Ontario - Bill 107, An Act to
Revise the Police Act and Amend the Law Relating to Police Services, 2d Sess., 34th Leg. Ont.,
1989, s. 48 - imposes an employment equity plan to eliminate systemic barriers to the
recruitment and promotion of proscribed groups, but it does not provide for the training of
officers for conducting investigatory detentions.
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regulations that constrain and structure police discretion in the
streets:
There is a need for training more directly related to the important problems which
the officer will face in the field - training which will instruct him on the limits of
his formal authority, but will also inform him of the department's judgment as to
what is the most desirable administrative practice to follow in exercising his
authority. Carefully developed administrative policies would serve this important
function.
2 2 2
The judiciary may lack both the competence and the legitimacy to
construct guidelines; however, "police rulemaking is unlikely to
proceed very far without considerable nudging from the courts."
223
Judicial "nudging" can be accomplished in a number of ways.
First, the judiciary must relax standing requirements so as to
allow police actions to be challenged by concerned citizens.
Currently, any issues relating to arbitrary detention only arise in a
piecemeal manner in the context of criminal trials; however, it has
been noted that the low visibility practice of street detention rarely
gives rise to a criminal charge. Accordingly, concerned individuals
should have access to the judicial forum to challenge arbitrary police
action which is not isolated but which has not culminated in criminal
charges. For example, minority residents of Philadelphia brought an
action to challenge alleged police misconduct. In the lower Court
it was established that police misconduct was not "rare or isolated 224
and the Court ordered that the police draft a comprehensive
program for handling citizen complaints. The u.s. Supreme Court
reversed this decision holding that the petitioners lacked the
requisite personal stake in the outcome to establish standing because
the petitioners could only complain about the possibility of future
violations of their rights by a small minority of state officials. This
restrictive approach to standing must not be followed in Canada if
the judiciary are to have the opportunity to provide direction to
222 H. Goldstein, "Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance' (1967) 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1123 at 1134.
223 Amsterdam, supra, note 219 at 379; also see K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A
Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: State University Press, 1969) at 94-95.
2 2 4 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 at 383 (1975).
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police officers and to induce departmental concern over street
encounters.
Of course, the likelihood of class actions being brought by
aggrieved residents, who do not face criminal charges, is slim.
Therefore, the judiciary's prime opportunity to goad the police
administration into promulgating guidelines will be found where
criminal defendants raise issues relating to arbitrary detention. The
courts must realize that when the opportunity presents itself they
must approach constitutional adjudication so that their decisions
"state or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles
for an expanding future."225 If the goal is to construct a future in
which most aspects of the police function are subject to reasonable
constraints and to proper guidelines, the judiciary must extend
themselves beyond their current approach to arbitrary detention.
There is little precedential value in the post hoc determination of
whether the police acted with reasonable cause in deciding to
intrude. There is little guidance provided when the judiciary instruct
the police that arbitrary means capricious or despotic and then send
the officers back on the streets.
If the judiciary are to look beyond the narrow horizons of
the individual cases, they must articulate rules that promote greater
police accountability in the future. For example, if the police
discover narcotics after approaching, questioning, and conducting a
pat-down search of an individual on the street, the court could take
the position that the fruits of the encounter will not be admissible
unless the officer shows that he or she was acting pursuant to rules
and regulations contained in a departmental policy. This
prophylactic rule of exclusion would apply regardless of whether the
officer was acting upon probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Blanket exclusion of all evidence obtained through unconstrained,
discretionary decisions of the officer in the field should motivate
police departments to take a serious look at the need for
promulgating guidelines.
Alternatively, the judiciary could exclude evidence obtained
through street encounters if the officer does not complete an
225 B. Cardozo, The Nantre of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963) at 83.
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occurrence report to be prepared contemporaneously with the
encounter. Most encounters that satisfy the threshold definition of
detention include the activity of the officer conducting an identity
check through the computer at the Canadian Police Information
Centre,226 and it would take little effort for the officer to provide
the dispatcher with a brief indication of the grounds for the stop
and the cPic check. Contemporaneous reports serve two functions:
(1) they prevent an officer from constructing a post hoc
rationalization for the intrusion; and (2) they can be periodically
reviewed by the police administration, independent review
committees, or even the judiciary to determine whether a given
officer is exercising his or her authority on the basis of personal
attributes of the target. Without written occurrence reports the
police will never be able to monitor if their training programs are
having an impact.
The form and procedure for the completion of reports
should not be dictated by the judiciary. Practical implementation of
such a requirement must be designed by the police themselves;
however, the judiciary can compel the introduction of this
requirement through manipulation of the exclusionary rule. There
is little doubt that the judiciary is uncomfortable with the role of
"policing the police." and the Supreme Court of Canada has stated
that the exclusionary rule is not designed to deter police
misconduct.227  However, judicial activism in monitoring police
conduct is not designed to deter the police in the sense of punishing
officers for misconduct - the correct perspective on the judicial
function in overseeing police action is well-stated by Brennan J. of
the u.s. Supreme Court:
ile [exclusionary] rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct by
individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own cases. But what
the Court overlooks is that the deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to
be, nor should it be thought of as. a form of "punishment" of individual police
officers for their failures to obey the restraints imposed by the fourth amendment.
Instead the chief deterrent function is its tendency to promote institutional
226 [Hereinafter CPIC]. See Ericson, supra, note 12 at 139-41, for empirical data
describing police use of CPIC checks.
227 R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at 280-81.
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compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement
agencies generally
2 2 8
The Charter not only requires a fresh perspective on the
police function, it necessitates a reformulation of the judicial
function. The courts should no longer approach rights as the
"protection of atomistic spheres of interest. 229 Rather, they should
adopt a regulatory approach that views constitutional adjudication as
a method of structuring state power to allow residents to reap the
benefits of Charter protection.230 Charter rights may incidentally
benefit individual litigants, yet their essential benefit must be to
ensure that the state remains within its constitutionally-limited
authority. A Charter violation must be remedied not only to shield
the individual from prejudice, arising from unconstitutional conduct,
but also to force the state to comply with the prescriptions of the
Charter in future cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitrary detention poses two dangers for the public: the
threat of indiscriminate intrusion and the threat of discriminatory
intrusion. In the area of criminal law enforcement, both the
judiciary and the legislatures have turned a blind eye to the obvious
dangers of investigatory street detention. They both claim that this
practice does not exist, and being satisfied that their claim is
accurate, they have avoided any attempts to regulate and control
street encounters. In this paper it has been argued that it is time
for the judiciary to intervene more actively in detention issues so as
to coax the rule-makers, whether legislators or police administrators,
into promulgating rules and regulations to guide the officer in the
field.
228 U.S. v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430 at 3442 (1983).
229 Amsterdam, supra, note 219 at 367.
230 See Amsterdam, ibid. at 367-72, for a discussion of the regulatory approach to the
Fourth Amendment; and see A. Young, "Not Waiving but Drowning: A Look at Waiver and
Collective Constitutional Rights in the Criminal Process" (1989) 53 Sask. L. Rev. 47, for a
discussion of the implications of a regulatory approach.
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The failure to address the twin dangers of arbitrary detention
will eventually have disastrous repercussions as the relationships
between police and minority residents deteriorate beyond repair.
We may no longer have a de jure vagrancy law, but there is de facto
targeting of minority citizens for intrusive police practice. Crime
rates appear to escalate, people grow increasingly concerned about
their security, and pressure mounts to further expand the ability of
the police to intrude in the name of crime prevention. Without
adequate regulatory control, the expansion of police powers is
invariably exercised against members of the public who, by choice
or by informal decree, remain outside the mainstream.
It has been noted that the modern trend is away from
individualism as the organizing force of social control, and towards
surveillance of whole categories of persons.23l Just as the mass
detention of Japanese-Canadians was seen as a rational response to
the problem of internal security during wartime, the advocates of
crime control and law and order see mass surveillance and the
widening of the spheres of social control as the solution to the
crime problem. In a small-scale society it may have been reasonable
to adopt an "all along the watchtower" approach to crime
prevention. In a large-scale industrial society, the police cannot and
should not be mobilized to exercise a front line social control
function.
When the police function is expanded to include a social
control function, the dangers of indiscriminate and discriminatory
intrusion are heightened. The right to be free from arbitrary
detention has a role to play in regulating the police function, but
this right as currently interpreted and implemented has had a
negligible impact upon police practice. The fault lies not only with
the police, but with those of us who fit comfortably into the
mainstream with little to fear from intrusive police practice and thus
remain complacent with the burgeoning growth of police power. It
is the modern-day vagrant, the social outcast, who bears the burden
of the strategic placement all along the watchtower of police officers
without any guidance as to what it is they should be looking for.
231 T. Mathiesen, "The Future of Control Systems - the Case of Norway' (1980) 8 Int'l
. Soc. L 148, as quoted in C. Shearing & P. Stenning, "From the Panopticon to Disney
World: The Development of Discipline," in Doob & Greenspan, supra, note 184 at 335.
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